应计盈余管理与现金流操控相互关系研究
A Study on the Relationship between Accrual Earnings Management and Cash Flow Manipulation
DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20200419.101
[1]吴秋生,马文琪.应计盈余管理与现金流操控相互关系研究[J/OL].财经研究,2021,47(02):154-168[2026-11-22].https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20200419.101.
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摘要
文章以2007−2018年我国A股上市公司为样本,通过建立联立方程模型,研究了应计盈余管理与现金流操控的内在互动关系。研究发现,应计盈余管理与现金流操控之间存在双向非对称的互动影响,过度负债会强化两者之间的互动关系;与国有企业相比,非国有企业应计盈余管理与现金流操控的配合问题更加严重;作为公司治理的主要手段,内部控制、高管持股与独立董事占比对上述关系有显著的抑制作用。文章的研究深化了上市公司应计盈余管理与现金流操控内在关系与发生规律的认识,揭示了财务状况和公司治理对上述关系的调节作用,对于投资者正确认识、政府部门有效监管和公司有效治理这两种财务操纵行为具有启示意义。
Recently exposed financial fraud cases show that the financial manipulation means of enterprises are becoming more and more complex, showing the characteristics of the coordination between accrual earnings management and cash flow manipulation. However, the existing literature either ignores the particularity of cash flow manipulation based on cash basis and does not consider the difference between cash flow manipulation and real earnings management, or fails to alleviate the endogeneity between the two types of earnings management and pay no attention to the internal interaction and interaction mechanism between them.
Based on the understanding that cash flow manipulation is different from real earnings management, this paper selects Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018 as research samples, and establishes the simultaneous equation model and adopts the three-stage least squares(3SLS)method to study the internal interaction between accrual earnings management and cash flow manipulation. It is found that there is a two-way asymmetric interaction between accrual earnings management and cash flow manipulation, that is, there is an interaction between cash flow manipulation and accrual earnings management, but in the process of cooperative control, the magnitude of cash flow manipulation is usually larger than the corresponding magnitude of accrual earnings management. When enterprises carry out positive accrual earnings management, the interaction between them will be stronger. Further research shows that excessive debt will further deepen the interaction between the two. Compared with state-owned enterprises, the coordination between accrual earnings management and cash flow manipulation in non-state-owned enterprises is more serious. Internal control, managerial stock holdings and proportion of independent directors, as the main means of corporate governance, have a significant inhibitory effect on the above relationship.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: Firstly, by establishing a simultaneous equation model, this paper uses the 3SLS method to conduct an empirical analysis on the relationship between accrual earnings management and cash flow manipulation, which alleviates the endogeneity between variables and improves the scientificity of the research results. In addition, it deeply studies the interactive mechanism, focuses on the direction and symmetry of the above-mentioned relationship, and deepens the understanding of the relationship between accrual earnings management and cash flow manipulation. Secondly, this paper studies the regulating effect of the relationship between accrual earnings management and cash flow manipulation on debt stress motivation, and provides new evidence to clarify the regulatory focus of interactive fraud and reveal the internal linkage of the three major financial statements when financial fraud takes place. Finally, this paper is helpful to reveal the internal relationship between cash flow manipulation and accrual earnings management, as well as the interactive mechanism of the three major statements in the process of corporate financial manipulation. And it has enlightenment significance for comprehensively and accurately understanding the mutual influence and external influence of various financial manipulation behaviors, and building comprehensive and systematic governance, auditing, and supervision mechanism based on corporate financial manipulation.
关键词: 应计盈余管理,现金流操控,过度负债,公司治理