外国经济与管理  2018, Vol. 40 Issue (9): 84-95

0

#### 文章信息

 外国经济与管理2018年40卷第9期

Liu Zhiying, Peng Baoan, Ma Chaoliang

Can descriptive information in reward-based crowdfunding affect financing performance?

Foreign Economics & Management, 2018, 40(9): 84-95.

### 文章历史

《外国经济与管理》
2018第40卷第9期

Can Descriptive Information in Reward-Based Crowdfunding Affect Financing Performance?
Liu Zhiying, Peng Baoan, Ma Chaoliang
School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
Summary: In traditional time, self-financing and angel investment are the major methods for project financing. In the Internet era, crowdfunding has become the popular financing mode for many innovative projects. This model greatly promotes the commercialization of innovative projects and becomes an important booster of " mass entrepreneurship and innovation”. Without expensive intermediary institutions, the transaction cost of crowdfunding is very low compared with the traditional financial mode. Many entrepreneurs choose to take this kind of financing mode and thus crowdfunding gets rapid development recently. However, crowdfunding is still in the emerging stage and has lots of problems such as the lack of experience in participants and information asymmetry. Therefore, how to raise the success rate of crowdfunding is an urgent problem.　　For the reward-based crowdfunding, the " pre-sale” business model is adopted and investors play a role of consumers in crowdfunding. Before the crowdfunding project makes success, investors are unable to access the product and it is difficult for investors to estimate the quality of the product. Therefore, investors’ trust in fund-raisers has a great influence on investment decisions. So how do fund-raisers pass on the right information to potential investors to gain their trust? Fund-raisers can only use descriptive information to pass on the information in crowdfunding. Descriptive information refers to the information of a person’s situation through a series of structural representations, such as the description of personal experiences, current conditions, or future prospects, in order to portray their qualities and characteristics to the outside world. In crowdfunding, descriptive information is the narrative language which reflects the fund-raiser’s situation, including the status of crowdfunding projects. It has been proved that descriptive information plays an important role in the economic field, and the business plan statement of entrepreneurs serves as an information bridge in financial transactions with a high degree of uncertainty. Similarly, descriptive information is also believed to play an important part in reward-based crowdfunding. Using the descriptive information to shape their own traits, Fund-raisers increase the potential trust of investors and thus influence investment decisions. Based on the theory of social exchange, our research divides the descriptive information of fund-raisers in reward-based crowdfunding into two aspects and uses the elaboration likelihood model, taking trust as the center path and communication as the edge of path to study the influence mechanism of the descriptive information of fund-raisers on financing performance in reward-based crowdfunding. This study examines the following issues: First, does fund-raisers’ descriptive information affect financing performance? Second, is the relationship between descriptive information and financing performance affected by the type of project? Third, is the effect of different kinds of characteristic information in descriptive information on financing performance the same? Using the 401 data set of domestic crowdfunding website, the empirical results show that the more the number of feature information, the number of project updates and the number of comments is, the higher the percent of financing is; for different project types, the descriptive information’s effects on the percent of financing are different; for different kinds of characteristic information, the impacts are also different.　　The main contributions of this paper are: First, based on the social exchange theory, our research uses the elaboration likelihood model to discuss the relationship among trust, communication and financing performance and explores the influence of descriptive information on financing performance. The results bring some insights to the research of crowdfunding financing performance. Second, our research introduces the characteristic information as an index of descriptive information, which is more objective and accurate since the index of alphanumeric or spelling accuracy cannot fully cover the characteristics of descriptive information. Our research provides some reference value to future research.
Key words: innovation; innovation project; crowdfunding; reward-based crowdfunding; descriptive information

（一）信任与融资绩效的关系

H1：项目介绍中包含的特征数量越多，融资完成比越高；项目介绍中包含的特征数量越少，融资完成比越低。

Mollick（2014）认为筹资者除了发布项目信息外，还需要在众筹期间，甚至众筹成功之后及时更新信息，向投资者汇报项目进展，以求吸引新的投资者。项目更新是筹资者对众筹项目融资进度的总结介绍，众筹项目每进入一个里程碑式的阶段，筹资者都可以将此信息更新在众筹平台上，向潜在的投资者传达此项目的质量以及自身的能力。项目更新越多，说明众筹项目融资进展得越顺利，可以降低投资者感知到的众筹项目融资失败的风险，增加投资者对筹资者能力的信任，从而影响投资者做出投资决策。据此，本文做出下列假设：

H2：众筹项目更新数量越多，项目融资完成比越高；众筹项目更新数量越少，项目融资完成比越低。

（二）交流与融资绩效的关系

H3：评论数量越多，项目融资完成比越高；评论数量越少，项目融资完成比越低。

（三）项目类型对描述性信息与融资绩效之间关系的影响

H4：项目类型不同，描述性信息对融资完成比的影响不同。

（四）特征信息种类与融资绩效的关系

H5：不同种类的特征信息数量会对融资绩效产生不同的影响。

 图 1 研究基本框架图

（一）数据来源

（二）特征信息选取

（三）变量描述

 关键变量 变量描述 因变量 融资完成比（Percent of financing，POF） 众筹项目实际筹资额与目标金额之比 自变量 特征信息数量 （No. of characteristic information，CI） “项目介绍”中包含的特征信息的数量 项目更新数量（Updates） 筹资者在“项目更新”中更新项目状态的数量 评论数量（Reviews） “评论”中筹资者和投资者交流的数量 调节变量 项目类型（Categories） 众筹项目的类型 控制变量 目标融资金额（Goal） 筹资者预期众筹项目筹集的金额

（四）分析模型

 $POF=C+D_1 \times Goal + A\times Categories$ (1)
 $POF=C+D_1 \times Goal+D_2 \times CI+D_3 \times Updates+A \times Categories$ (2)
 $POF=C+D_1 \times Goal+D_2 \times CI+D_3 \times Updates+D_4 \times Reviews+A \times Categories$ (3)

（一）描述性信息与融资绩效的关系

 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 1. POF 101.536 275.232 1 1 2. Goal 76 158.761 190 926.766 0 –0.109** 1 3. CI 3.81 1.284 0.158*** –0.024 1 4. Updates 2.254 3.265 8 0.132*** –0.070* 0.051 1 5. Reviews 12.616 40.634 9 0.187*** –0.005 0.128*** 0.235*** 1 注：N=401；***、**、*分别表示在1%、5%、10%水平上统计显著。

 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 β t VIF β t VIF β t VIF Goal –0.109** –2.181 1.000 –0.097** –1.971 1.005 –0.099** –2.034 1.006 CI 0.150*** 3.061 1.003 0.132*** 2.711 1.018 Updates 0.117** 2.390 1.007 0.083* 1.655 1.064 Reviews 0.150*** 2.994 1.074 F 4.758** 6.922*** 7.537*** R2 0.012 0.050 0.071 ΔR2 0.038 0.021 注：***、**、*分别表示在1%、5%、10%水平上统计显著。

（二）项目类型对描述性信息与融资绩效关系的影响

 agriculture（N=130） publication（N=63） art（N=77） others（N=105） Model1 Model2 Model3 Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 Goal –0.153* –0.129* –0.137* –0.099* –0.082 –0.111 –0.118 –0.070 –0.067* –0.096* –0.089* –0.054* CI 0.008* 0.077* 0.207 0.186 0.213* 0.217** 0.167** 0.069* Updates 0.206*** 0.056** –0.041 –0.059 0.281** 0.243** 0.182* 0.023* Reviews 0.503** 0.066 1.333 0.732*** F 3.087* 2.931** 10.033*** 0.601* 1.179 0.920 1.063 4.046 3.396** 0.965 2.862** 30.274*** R2 0.024 0.065 0.243 0.010 0.057 0.060 0.014 0.143 0.159 0.009 0.078 0.548 ΔR2 0.041 0.178 0.047 0.003 0.129 0.016 0.069 0.470 Max VIF 1.000 1.026 1.406 1.000 1.041 1.404 1.000 1.020 1.096 1.000 1.019 1.141 注：***、**、*分别表示在1%、5%、10%水平上统计显著。

（三）特征信息种类与融资绩效关系

 β t VIF Goal –0.1** –2.031 1.047 Updates 0.047 0.924 1.131 Reviews 0.167*** 3.289 1.127 Introduction –0.015 –0.303 1.041 Reasons 0.044 0.740 1.516 Return 0.003 0.057 1.625 About me 0.019 0.341 1.299 Contact 0.126** 2.475 1.133 Certificate 0.042 0.868 1.036 Use of funds –0.109** –1.977 1.322 Risk 0.159*** 3.053 1.183 Progress 0.105** 2.118 1.062 F 3.952*** R2 0.115 注：***、**、*分别表示在1%、5%、10%水平上统计显著。

（四）稳健性检验

 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 β t VIF β t VIF β t VIF Goal –0.096 –1.925* 1.000 –0.087** –1.871 1.005 –0.077* –1.778 1.006 CI 0.143*** 2.961 1.003 0.117*** 2.667 1.018 Updates 0.257** 5.390 1.007 0.198*** 4.421 1.064 Reviews 0.380*** 8.450 1.074 F 3.706* 12.922*** 33.886*** R2 0.009 0.083 0.255 ΔR2 0.074 0.172 注：***、**、*分别表示在1%、5%、10%水平上统计显著。

 agriculture（N=130） publication（N=63） art（N=77） others（N=105） Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model1 Model2 Model3 Goal –0.045* –0.008* –0.004* –0.801*** –0.794*** –0.752*** –0.078 –0.081 –0.061* –0.077 –0.068* –0.018* CI 0.121* 0.020* 0.104 –0.136 0.097* 0.171** 0.181* 0.126* Updates 0.323*** 0.060* 0.028 0.002 0.117 0.111* 0.223** 0.108** Reviews 0.736*** 0.095 0.804 0.410*** F 0.258* 5.940** 31.796*** 109.401* 37.244*** 28.261*** 0.462 0.699 0.965*** 0.616 3.694** 8.170*** R2 0.002 0.124 0.504 0.642 0.654 0.661 0.006 0.028 0.157 0.006 0.099 0.246 ΔR2 0.122 0.380 0.012 0.007 0.022 0.129 0.093 0.147 MaxVIF 1.000 1.026 1.406 1.000 1.041 1.404 1.000 1.020 1.096 1.000 1.019 1.141 注：***、**、*分别表示在1%、5%、10%水平上统计显著。

（一）研究结论

（二）管理启示

（三）研究展望

 [1] 李焰, 高弋君, 李珍妮, 等. 借款人描述性信息对投资人决策的影响——基于P2P网络借贷平台的分析[J]. 经济研究, 2014(S1): 143–155. [2] 刘志迎, 石磊, 马朝良, 等. 众筹融资绩效影响因素研究——基于文献综述的视角[J]. 科学学与科学技术管理, 2016(11): 117–127. [3] 郑海超, 黄宇梦, 王涛, 等. 创新项目股权众筹融资绩效的影响因素研究[J]. 中国软科学, 2015(1): 130–138. [4] Agrawal A, Catalini C, Goldfarb A. Are syndicates the killer app of equity crowdfunding?[J]. California Management Review, 2016, 58(2): 111–124. [5] Belleflamme P, Lambert T, Schwienbacher A. Crowdfunding: Tapping the right crowd[J]. Journal of Business Venturing, 2014, 29(5): 585–609. [6] Bi S, Liu Z Y, Usman K. The influence of online information on investing decisions of reward-based crowdfunding[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2017, 71: 10–18. [7] Colombo M G, Franzoni C, Rossi-Lamastra C. Internal social capital and the attraction of early contributions in crowdfunding[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2015, 39(1): 75–100. [8] Cox D F, Rich S U. Perceived risk and consumer decision-making: The case of telephone shopping[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 1964, 1(4): 32–39. [9] Dellavigna S, Gentzkow M. Persuasion: Empirical evidence[J]. Annual Review of Economics, 2009, 2: 643–669. [10] Gerber E M, Hui J L. Crowdfunding: Motivations and deterrents for participation[J]. ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction, 2013, 20(6): 34. [11] Herzenstein M, Sonenshein S, Dholakia U M. Tell me a good story and i may lend you money: The role of narratives in peer-to-peer lending decisions[J]. Journal of Marketing Research, 2011, 48(SPL): S138–S149. [12] Howe J. Crowdsourcing: A definition[M]. Crowdsourcing: Tracking the Rise of the Amateur, 2006. [13] Mollick E. The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study[J]. Journal of Business Venturing, 2014, 29(1): 1–16. [14] Nisbett R E, Zukier H, Lemley R E. The dilution effect: Nondiagnostic information weakens the implications of diagnostic information[J]. Cognitive Psychology, 1981, 13(2): 248–277. [15] Park D H, Kim S. The effects of consumer knowledge on message processing of electronic word-of-mouth via online consumer reviews[J]. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, 2008, 7(4): 399–410. [16] Schlosser A E. Can including pros and cons increase the helpfulness and persuasiveness of online reviews? The interactive effects of ratings and arguments[J]. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 2011, 21(3): 226–239. [17] Shih H P, Lai K H, Cheng T C E. Informational and relational influences on electronic word of mouth: An empirical study of an online consumer discussion forum[J]. International Journal of Electronic Commerce, 2013, 17(4): 137–166. [18] Yuan H, Lau R Y K, Xu W. The determinants of crowdfunding success: A semantic text analytics approach[J]. Decision Support Systems, 2016, 91: 67–76.