国有资本异地布局与高质量发展

Cross-regional Layout of State-owned Capital and High-quality Development: Empirical Evidence from Cross-regional Holdings by Local Governments

邱保印¹,孙珍珍¹,郭著名²

2026 第 48 卷 第 11 期 页码 37-54

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20260508.202

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摘要

地方国有资本异地布局作为调节政府与市场关系的重要探索,其对微观企业高质量发展的影响尚未得到充分关注。本文以地方国有企业被异地政府控股为场景,基于2008—2023年中国A股国有上市公司数据,从微观层面考察地方国有资本异地布局对地方国企高质量发展的影响。研究发现,地方国有资本异地布局能够显著推动企业高质量发展,在进行一系列稳健性检验后,这一结论仍然成立;机制检验表明,减轻企业承担的政策性负担以及增强管理层权力是地方国有资本异地布局推动地方国企高质量发展的潜在作用机制;进一步分析发现,地方国有资本异地布局对企业高质量发展的推动作用在地方国有资本为商业竞争类资本、地方国企所在地市场化水平较高、地方国企属于非高科技行业的情况下更为显著。此外,经济后果检验表明,地方国有资本异地布局能够通过促进企业高质量发展进一步助力全国统一大市场的形成。以上结果在一定程度上为全面评估国企改革成效、深化国有资本配置改革提供了新的视角,为我国高质量发展的战略推进提供了基于微观企业经验的理论依据与实践启示。

As an important attempt to balance government-market relations, the cross-regional layout of local state-owned capital has not been fully examined regarding its impact on micro-enterprise high-quality development. Focusing on local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by governments outside their registered regions, this paper investigates the impact of such cross-regional layout on the high-quality development of local SOEs using data from China’s A-share listed SOEs from 2008 to 2023. The study finds that cross-regional layout significantly boosts the high-quality development of enterprises. Mechanism testing shows that it works by reducing policy burdens and strengthening managerial power. Further analysis reveals that the promoting effect is more pronounced when local state-owned capital is classified as commercial competitive capital, when local SOEs are located in regions with a higher degree of marketization, and when local SOEs belong to non-high-tech industries. Economic consequence testing indicates that the cross-regional layout of local state-owned capital can further facilitate the formation of a unified national market by boosting the high-quality development of enterprises. To a certain extent, this paper provides a new perspective for comprehensively evaluating the effectiveness of SOE reform and deepening the reform of state-owned capital layout, and offers theoretical and practical implications supported by micro-enterprise experience for the strategic advancement of China’s high-quality development.

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