基于组织理论的标准必要专利竞争动态管理过程研究

The Dynamic Management Process of Competition over Standard-Essential Patents: An Organizational Theory Perspective

毛昊¹²,柏杨¹

2026 第 48 卷 第 11 期 页码 55-73

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20260819.401

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摘要

随着技术标准在高技术产业和数字经济中的基础性作用增强,标准必要专利已成为连接技术创新、企业竞争与制度治理的重要议题。现有研究虽在标准形成、企业策略和制度治理等方面形成较丰富积累,但仍存在分析层次分散、概念边界交叉和过程机制解释不足等问题。本文以Web of Science核心合集SSCI子库1995—2025年139篇英文期刊文献为核心样本,基于组织理论四视角进行系统梳理。研究发现,现有文献可归纳为竞争边界形成、创新收益转化和竞争优势稳定三组解释路径:技术范式、网络外部性、标准组织规则与企业专利布局、标准参与共同塑造竞争边界;企业借助专利组合、组织位置和互补资产形成规则影响力,其收益实现受公平、合理和无歧视(FRAND)承诺、许可层级、司法裁判和反垄断规制约束;规则影响力还需在标准组织、许可规则、司法监管和产业协同作用下协调权利保护、创新激励与产业扩散,方能沉淀为产业优势。由此,本文构建“环境约束—企业行动—治理协同”的过程性解释框架,揭示标准必要专利竞争是技术能力向规则影响力和产业优势持续转化的动态管理过程,并识别中国后发企业在规则进入、收益转化和治理协同中的边界条件。

Drawing on 139 English-language journal articles indexed in the SSCI database of the Web of Science Core Collection from 1995 to January 2025, this paper systematically reviews competition over standard-essential patents (SEPs) through the four perspectives of organizational theory. The literature can be organized into three interconnected explanatory paths: the formation of competitive boundaries, innovation value capture, and the stabilization of competitive advantages. Technological paradigms, network externalities, rules of standard-setting organizations, patent portfolios, and standardization participation jointly shape competitive boundaries; firms build rule-shaping influence through patent portfolios, organizational positions, and complementary assets, while value realization is constrained by FRAND commitments, licensing levels, judicial adjudication, and antitrust regulation; and such rule-shaping influence can be consolidated into industrial advantages only through coordination among standard-setting organizations, licensing rules, judicial governance, and industrial collaboration in balancing rights protection, innovation incentives, and industrial diffusion. On this basis, this paper develops a processual framework of “environmental constraints–firm actions–governance coordination”, revealing SEP competition as a dynamic management process in which technological capabilities are continuously transformed into rule-shaping influence and industrial advantages, while also identifying the boundary conditions faced by Chinese latecomer firms in rule entry, value capture, and governance coordination.

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