司法改善与年报披露相似性——来自我国巡回法庭准自然实验的经验证据
Judicial Improvement and Similarity of Annual Report Disclosure: Empirical Evidence from the Quasi-natural Experiment of Circuit Courts in China
DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20241024.203
[1]周胜娣,蓝发钦.司法改善与年报披露相似性——来自我国巡回法庭准自然实验的经验证据[J/OL].外国经济与管理,2025,47(03):53-69[2026-11-20].https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20241024.203.
摘要
为提升地区司法质量,最高人民法院自2015年起分批设立地方巡回法庭。本文借助这一准自然实验,实证考察了地区司法水平提升对企业自愿披露的影响。研究结果表明,巡回法庭的设立显著降低了企业年报相似度,提高了信息含量和自愿披露质量。机制分析显示,巡回法庭通过破解地方保护主义,并发挥威慑和治理效应,促进企业提升自愿披露质量。进一步研究发现,这一效果在初始外部治理环境较差、信息质量较低、诉讼成本较高的企业中更为显著,且对改善企业披露的内部相似性和横向相似性均有积极影响。此外,巡回法庭的设立还有助于抑制企业的收益操纵行为。本研究不仅丰富了“法与金融”领域的文献,也为司法改革及其经济后果提供了新的视角和实证依据。
To enhance regional judicial quality, the Supreme People’s Court of China has been establishing local circuit courts in phases since 2015. This paper utilizes the quasi-natural experiment to empirically examine the impact of improved regional judicial standards on corporate voluntary disclosure. The findings indicate that the establishment of circuit courts significantly reduces the similarity of corporate annual reports, thereby increasing information content and improving the quality of voluntary disclosure. Mechanism testing reveals that circuit courts promote enterprises to improve the quality of voluntary disclosure by addressing local protectionism and exerting deterrent and governance effects. Further investigation shows that this effect is more pronounced in enterprises with initially poorer external governance environments, lower information quality, and higher litigation costs, and positively affects both internal and horizontal similarities in corporate disclosure. Additionally, the establishment of circuit courts helps to mitigate corporate earnings manipulation. This paper not only enriches the literature in the field of “law and finance”, but also provides new perspectives and empirical evidence on judicial reform and its economic consequences.
关键词: 司法改善,自愿披露,年报相似度,收益操纵