消失的就业:控股股东质押股票贷款的劳动力市场后果

Disappearing Jobs: The Labor Market Consequence of Controlling Shareholder Share Pledging

李瑞涛,李传宪,郭世俊

2024 第 46 卷 第 09 期 页码 31-47

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20240209.202

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摘要

就业是民生之本,当前我国经济社会面临较大就业压力。本文从就业视角考察控股股东质押股票贷款的社会福利影响。使用2007—2019年期间A股上市公司样本,研究发现,控股股东质押股票贷款会导致上市公司层面就业吸纳水平显著下降。特别地,在遭受控股股东资金侵占和因超额雇佣面临更大劳动成本压力的公司中,控股股东质押股票贷款后引发的就业下滑现象更为严重。同时,控股股东股票质押后的就业下滑现象,在非国企、资产规模小、融资约束高以及控股股东相对控股的样本中更为严重。拓展性分析表明,高、低学历员工群体的雇佣规模都因控股股东的质押股票贷款行为而出现显著下滑,并且这种就业下滑在控股股东将股票质押贷款投向上市公司体外项目时更加明显。因此,对上市企业控股股东层面的股票质押融资行为,出台针对性的限制政策,可能有助于“稳就业”政策发挥更大效力。

Employment is the foundation of people’s livelihoods. Currently, there is significant employment pressure in the Chinese society. This paper examines the impact of controlling shareholder share pledging on the social welfare from the perspective of employment. Using the sample of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019 in China, the study finds that controlling shareholder share pledging is negatively associated with the employment level. It is also found that the negative association is stronger in enterprises experiencing an expropriation of controlling shareholders’ funds and enterprises facing higher labor costs due to overemployment. Furthermore, the baseline findings are stronger in non-state-owned enterprises, small enterprises, enterprises with higher financial constraints, and enterprises with smaller controlling shareholder ownership. Further analysis shows that the employment scale of both higher and lower education groups shrinks due to controlling shareholder share pledging. Additionally, the decline is more pronounced when controlling shareholders pledge stocks for loans directed towards off-market projects. Therefore, implementing appropriate restrictions on controlling shareholder share pledging may contribute to the effectiveness of the policy of “ensuring stability in employment”.

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