家族企业分殊偏待的前因组态研究——基于“能力-意愿”框架的fsQCA分析

Antecedent Configuration of Bifurcation Bias in Family Firms: A fsQCA Analysis Based on the “Ability-Willingness” Framework

李晓彤,李炜文,曾颖娴

2026 第 48 卷 第 03 期 页码 3-24

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20251231.103

PDF全文下载 HTML全文

摘要

分殊偏待理论认为,家族企业普遍存在着优待家族成员的现象且通常难以避免。然而,现实中有不少家族企业反而平等对待甚至更优待非家族成员。基于“能力−意愿”理论框架,本文认为既有文献多聚焦于控股家族的意愿因素,对其展现家族导向独特行为所需要的能力以及能力与意愿之间的互动机制关注不足,这导致了理论预测与现实情况的矛盾。鉴于此,本文以2010—2019年中国制造业家族上市公司为样本,运用模糊集定性比较分析方法,探究家族控制、外部监督、市场竞争、亲缘关系、代际传承及家族企业合法性六个前因条件对分殊偏待的作用机制。研究发现:(1)高程度分殊偏待存在“能力−意愿双高主导型”“意愿−能力补充型”“能力−意愿协同型”三类路径。(2)非高程度分殊偏待存在“能力−意愿双低约束型”“意愿−能力断裂型”两类路径。本文从“能力−意愿”理论视角揭示了分殊偏待的形成机制,深化了对于分殊偏待现象的理解,并将其与家族企业双元目标、治理环境整合,拓展了分殊偏待的理论边界,为实现家族系统与企业系统的双元平衡提供了实践启示。

Previous research on bifurcation bias suggests that family firms generally provide preferential treatment to family members over non-family member. In reality, many family firms provide equal or more favorable treatment to non-family members. Based on the “ability-willingness” framework, this paper argues that existing literature predominantly focuses on the willingness of controlling families, while paying insufficient attention to their ability to engage in family-oriented particularistic behavior and the interactive mechanisms between ability and willingness. This oversight has led to contradictions between theory and practice. Therefore, using a sample of China’s listed manufacturing family firms from 2010 to 2019, this paper employs Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) to investigate how the configuration of six antecedent conditions—family control, external supervision, market competition, kinship relationships, intergenerational succession, and family firm legitimacy—shapes bifurcation bias. The study reveals that: (1) A high level of bifurcation bias is driven by three configurations: “ability-willingness dual-high dominant type”, “willingness-ability complementary type”, and “ability-willingness collaborative type”. (2) A non-high level of bifurcation bias is associated with two configurations: “ability-willingness dual-low constrained type” and “ability-willingness disjointed type”. This paper reveals the configuration of bifurcation bias, thereby extending the theoretical boundaries of bifurcation bias and providing actionable guidance for balancing the family and firm systems.

参考文献

8 杜运周, 刘秋辰, 陈凯薇, 等. 营商环境生态、全要素生产率与城市高质量发展的多元模式——基于复杂系统观的组态分析[J]. 管理世界, 2022, 38(9): 127-144. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1002-5502.2022.09.010
9 巩键, 陈凌, 王健茜, 等. 从众还是独具一格?——中国家族企业战略趋同的实证研究[J]. 管理世界, 2016, (11): 110-124. DOI:10.19744/j.cnki.11-1235/f.2016.11.009
24 许年行, 于上尧, 伊志宏. 机构投资者羊群行为与股价崩盘风险[J]. 管理世界, 2013, (7): 31-43.
30 张明, 蓝海林, 陈伟宏, 等. 殊途同归不同效: 战略变革前因组态及其绩效研究[J]. 管理世界, 2020, 36(9): 168-185.
35 祝振铎, 李新春, 赵勇. 父子共治与创新决策——中国家族企业代际传承中的父爱主义与深谋远虑效应[J]. 管理世界, 2021, 37(9): 191-206,232.
36 Anderson R C, Reeb D M. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2003, 58(3): 1301-1328. DOI:10.1111/1540-6261.00567
37 Arregle J L, Hitt M A, Sirmon D G, et al. The development of organizational social capital: Attributes of family firms[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2007, 44(1): 73-95. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00665.x
38 Bell R G, Filatotchev I, Aguilera R V. Corporate governance and investors’ perceptions of foreign IPO value: An institutional perspective[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2014, 57(1): 301-320. DOI:10.5465/amj.2011.0146
39 Berrone P, Cruz C, Gómez-Mejía L R. Socioemotional wealth in family firms: Theoretical dimensions, assessment approaches, and agenda for future research[J]. Family Business Review, 2012, 25(3): 258-279. DOI:10.1177/0894486511435355
40 Berrone P, Duran P, Gómez-Mejía L R, et al. Impact of informal institutions on the prevalence, strategy, and performance of family firms: A meta-analysis[J]. Journal of International Business Studies, 2022, 53(6): 1153-1177. DOI:10.1057/s41267-020-00362-6
41 Cabrera-Suárez M K, Déniz-Déniz M C, Martín-Santana J D. Family social capital, trust within the TMT, and the establishment of corporate goals related to nonfamily stakeholders[J]. Family Business Review, 2015, 28(2): 145-162. DOI:10.1177/0894486514526754
42 Chrisman J J, Chua J H, Pearson A W, et al. Family involvement, family influence, and family-centered non-economic goals in small firms[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2012, 36(2): 267-293. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2010.00407.x
43 Chrisman J J, Memili E, Misra K. Nonfamily managers, family firms, and the winner’s curse: The influence of noneconomic goals and bounded rationality[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2014, 38(5): 1-25.
44 Chua J H, Chrisman J J, Bergiel E B. An agency theoretic analysis of the professionalized family firm[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2009, 33(2): 355-372. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2009.00294.x
45 Chung C N, Luo X W. Institutional logics or agency costs: The influence of corporate governance models on business group restructuring in emerging economies[J]. Organization Science, 2008, 19(5): 766-784. DOI:10.1287/orsc.1070.0342
46 Cruz C C, Gómez-Mejía L R, Becerra M. Perceptions of benevolence and the design of agency contracts: CEO-TMT relationships in family firms[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2010, 53(1): 69-89. DOI:10.5465/amj.2010.48036975
47 Daspit J J, Chrisman J J, Sharma P, et al. Governance as a source of family firm heterogeneity[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2018, 84: 293-300. DOI:10.1016/j.jbusres.2017.12.041
48 De Massis A, Kotlar J, Chua J H, et al. Ability and willingness as sufficiency conditions for family-oriented particularistic behavior: Implications for theory and empirical studies[J]. Journal of Small Business Management, 2014, 52(2): 344-364. DOI:10.1111/jsbm.12102
49 Fang H C, Randolph R V D G, Memili E, et al. Does size matter? The moderating effects of firm size on the employment of nonfamily managers in privately held family SMEs[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2016, 40(5): 1017-1039. DOI:10.1111/etap.12156
50 Fiss P C. Building better causal theories: A fuzzy set approach to typologies in organization research[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2011, 54(2): 393-420. DOI:10.5465/amj.2011.60263120
51 Gómez-Mejía L R, Campbell J T, Martin G, et al. Socioemotional wealth as a mixed gamble: Revisiting family firm R&D investments with the behavioral agency model[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2014, 38(6): 1351-1374. DOI:10.1111/etap.12083
52 Gómez-Mejía L R, Haynes K T, Núñez-Nickel M, et al. Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2007, 52(1): 106-137. DOI:10.2189/asqu.52.1.106
53 Greckhamer T. CEO compensation in relation to worker compensation across countries: The configurational impact of country-level institutions[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2016, 37(4): 793-815. DOI:10.1002/smj.2370
54 Jaskiewicz P, Luchak A A. Explaining performance differences between family firms with family and nonfamily CEOs: It’s the nature of the tie to the family that counts![J] Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2013, 37(6): 1361-1367.
55 Jeong S H, Kim H, Kim H. Strategic nepotism in family director appointments: Evidence from family business groups in South Korea[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2022, 65(2): 656-682. DOI:10.5465/amj.2018.1418
56 Jennings J E, Dempsey D, James A E. Bifurcated HR practices in family firms: Insights from the normative-adaptive approach to stepfamilies[J]. Human Resource Management Review, 2018, 28(1): 68-82. DOI:10.1016/j.hrmr.2017.05.007
57 Kano L, Verbeke A. Family firm internationalization: Heritage assets and the impact of bifurcation bias[J]. Global Strategy Journal, 2018, 8(1): 158-183. DOI:10.1002/gsj.1186
58 Kellermanns F W, Eddleston K A. Feuding families: When conflict does a family firm good[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2004, 28(3): 209-228. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2004.00040.x
59 Lien Y C, Li S M. Professionalization of family business and performance effect[J]. Family Business Review, 2014, 27(4): 346-364. DOI:10.1177/0894486513482971
60 Lumpkin G T, Brigham K H. Long-term orientation and intertemporal choice in family firms[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2011, 35(6): 1149-1169. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2011.00495.x
61 Madison K, Holt D T, Kellermanns F W, et al. Viewing family firm behavior and governance through the lens of agency and stewardship theories[J]. Family Business Review, 2016, 29(1): 65-93. DOI:10.1177/0894486515594292
62 Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I, Minichilli A, et al. When do non-family CEOs outperform in family firms? Agency and behavioural agency perspectives[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2014, 51(4): 547-572. DOI:10.1111/joms.12076
63 Misangyi V F, Acharya A G. Substitutes or complements? A configurational examination of corporate governance mechanisms[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2014, 57(6): 1681-1705. DOI:10.5465/amj.2012.0728
64 Ordanini A, Parasuraman A, Rubera G. When the recipe is more important than the ingredients: A qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of service innovation configurations[J]. Journal of Service Research, 2014, 17(2): 134-149. DOI:10.1177/1094670513513337
65 Ragin C C, Fiss P C. Net effects analysis versus configurational analysis: An empirical demonstration[A]. Ragin C C. Redesigning social inquiry: Fuzzy sets and beyond[M]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
66 Samara G, Jamali D, Parada M J. Antecedents and outcomes of bifurcated compensation in family firms: A multilevel view[J]. Human Resource Management Review, 2021, 31(1): 100728. DOI:10.1016/j.hrmr.2019.100728
67 Sanchez-Famoso V, Akhter N, Iturralde T, et al. Is non-family social capital also (or especially) important for family firm performance?[J]. Human Relations, 2015, 68(11): 1713-1743. DOI:10.1177/0018726714565724
68 Schneider C Q, Wagemann C. Set-theoretic methods for the social sciences: A guide to qualitative comparative analysis[M]. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
69 Schulze W S, Kellermanns F W. Reifying socioemotional wealth[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2015, 39(3): 447-459. DOI:10.1111/etap.12159
70 Schulze W S, Lubatkin M H, Dino R N, et al. Agency relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence[J]. Organization Science, 2001, 12(2): 99-116. DOI:10.1287/orsc.12.2.99.10114
71 Schulze W S, Lubatkin M H, Dino R N. Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms[J]. Journal of Business Venturing, 2003, 18(4): 473-490. DOI:10.1016/S0883-9026(03)00054-5
72 Sirmon D G, Hitt M A. Managing resources: Linking unique resources, management, and wealth creation in family firms[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2003, 27(4): 339-358. DOI:10.1111/1540-8520.t01-1-00013
73 Stewart A, Hitt M A. Why can’t a family business be more like a nonfamily business?: Modes of professionalization in family firms[J]. Family Business Review, 2012, 25(1): 58-86. DOI:10.1177/0894486511421665
74 Verbeke A, Kano L. The transaction cost economics theory of the family firm: Family–based human asset specificity and the bifurcation bias[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2012, 36(6): 1183-1205. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2012.00545.x
75 Verbeke A, Yuan W L, Kano L. A values-based analysis of bifurcation bias and its impact on family firm internationalization[J]. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 2020, 37(2): 449-477. DOI:10.1007/s10490-018-9598-4
76 Wade J B, O'Reilly III C A, Pollock T G. Overpaid CEOs and underpaid managers: Fairness and executive compensation[J]. Organization Science, 2006, 17(5): 527-544. DOI:10.1287/orsc.1060.0204
77 Yu X D, Stanley L, Li Y P, et al. The invisible hand of evolutionary psychology: The importance of kinship in first-generation family firms[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2020, 44(1): 134-157. DOI:10.1177/1042258719838256
78 Zellweger T M, Nason R S, Nordqvist M, et al. Why do family firms strive for nonfinancial goals? An organizational identity perspective[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2013, 37(2): 229-248. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2011.00466.x