夫妻地位反转与家族企业审计师选择

Marital Role Reversion and Auditor Choice in Family Firms

杜善重,马连福

2023 第 45 卷 第 11 期 页码 62-78

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20221228.202

PDF全文下载 HTML全文

摘要

夫妻地位反转是指妻子在“夫妻店”家族企业的董事会或管理层中担任的职务高于丈夫职务的现象,这是一种基于婚姻与家族关系的权力配置模式。本文以夫妻共同控制的家族企业为样本,实证检验了夫妻地位反转对于家族企业审计师选择的影响。研究发现,夫妻地位反转促使家族企业选择高质量审计师,其影响机制在于完善家族企业内部公司治理。对于改制型、国有股东制衡程度较低和处于传统伦理文化较弱地区的家族企业来说,夫妻地位反转对审计师选择的积极影响更加显著。基于夫妻特征因素的研究发现,婚姻状况、后代涉入数量和高管亲戚属性均会影响夫妻地位反转与审计师选择的关系。进一步区分控制权配置的研究发现,当控制权更多地配置给丈夫时,夫妻地位反转能够更有效地促使家族企业选择高质量审计师。最后,本文还排除了“夫妻店”家族企业选择高质量审计师可能存在的妻子谨慎决策的替代性假说。本文从夫妻关系视角深入探讨了“夫妻店”家族企业的审计师选择决策,为如何通过在夫妻之间合理进行权力配置从而优化审计师选择决策提供了理论参考。

In recent years, couple-controlled family firms in China have frequently led to “thunderstorm” in the capital market. Under this realistic background, hiring high-quality auditors has become an important means to help couple-controlled family firms improve their corporate governance mechanism. Although some studies have focused on the related topics of auditor choice in family firms, few focus on couple-controlled family firms, and the motivation of auditor choice has not been explored from the perspective of husband-wife power allocation mode. As the strategic choice of firms mainly depends on key decision-makers, how the husband and wife, who are the key decision-makers of couple-controlled family firms, allocate their power will have a direct impact on the strategic decision.

With the continuous progress of the society, the position of wife is increasingly prominent. In some couple-controlled family firms, the wife holds a higher position in the board of directors or the management than her husband, which is defined as “marital role reversion” in this paper. Marital role reversion not only optimizes the existing power allocation mode under the joint leadership of husband and wife, but also impacts the concept of family firm governance under the traditional social and cultural cognition, thus further conforming to China’s basic national policy of equality between men and women. Therefore, it has become an important standard to test the effectiveness of marital role reversion by discussing whether it can prompt family firms to hire high-quality auditors to improve their corporate governance mechanism.

This paper takes couple-controlled family firms as the sample, and empirically tests the impact of marital role reversion on the auditor choice in family firms. The study finds that marital role reversion promotes family firms to choose high-quality auditors, and its mechanism is that the wife actively seeks high-quality auditors for the purpose of improving the corporate governance mechanism of family firms. For non-entrepreneurship family firms, family firms with a low degree of checks and balances of state-owned shareholders, and family firms in areas with weak traditional culture, the positive impact of marital role reversion on auditor choice is more significant. Based on the research of marital characteristics, it is found that the marital status, the number of offspring involvement and the attributes of senior executives’ relatives all affect the relationship between marital role reversion and auditor choice. The study further distinguishes the allocation of control power and finds that when control power is more allocated to the husband, marital role reversion can more effectively promote family firms to select high-quality auditors. Finally, this paper also excludes the alternative hypothesis that a family firm may have a cautious wife when choosing a high-quality auditor.

This paper analyzes the motivation mechanism of auditor choice in family firms from the perspective of husband-wife relationship, which not only provides an effective way to help family firms improve their corporate governance mechanism, but also has important value in helping the sustained and healthy development of national economy.

参考文献

1 董雪雁, 崔倚菁, 高靖宇. 公司战略差异度与审计师选择[J]. 会计研究, 2021, (6): 144-158. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2021.06.011
2 杜善重. 数字金融的公司治理效应——基于非家族股东治理视角[J]. 财贸经济, 2022, 43(2): 68-82. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1002-8102.2022.02.005
4 李百兴, 赵庆庆, 李瑞敬. 企业金融化与审计师选择[J]. 审计研究, 2020, (5): 67-76. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1002-4239.2020.05.009
5 李新春, 贺小刚, 邹立凯. 家族企业研究: 理论进展与未来展望[J]. 管理世界, 2020, 36(11): 207-228. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1002-5502.2020.11.015
10 Amore M D, Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I, et al. For love and money: Marital leadership in family firms[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2017, 46: 461-476. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.09.004
11 Anderson R C, Reeb D M. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2003, 58(3): 1301-1328. DOI:10.1111/1540-6261.00567
12 Belenzon S, Patacconi A, Zarutskie R. Married to the firm? A large-scale investigation of the social context of ownership[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2016, 37(13): 2611-2638. DOI:10.1002/smj.2441
13 Chen Y, Li S X. Group identity and social preferences[J]. American Economic Review, 2009, 99(1): 431-457. DOI:10.1257/aer.99.1.431
14 Erat S, Gneezy U. White lies[J]. Management Science, 2012, 58(4): 723-733. DOI:10.1287/mnsc.1110.1449
15 Healy P M, Palepu K G. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2001, 31(1-3): 405-440. DOI:10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00018-0
16 Titman S, Trueman B. Information quality and the valuation of new issues[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1986, 8(2): 159-172. DOI:10.1016/0165-4101(86)90016-9