媒体背景董秘有助于减少财务重述吗?

Can Board Secretaries with Media Experience Reduce Financial Restatements?

赵群,陈宁,方军雄

2023 第 45 卷 第 07 期 页码 106-122

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20221018.201

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摘要

董事会秘书(下文简称为董秘)作为连接上市公司与外部利益相关者的沟通桥梁,信息披露和投资者关系管理是董秘重要的职能,根据高阶理论,董秘职责的履行会受到其背景特征的影响。鉴于财务重述作为公司修正前期财务报告的过程,具有严重的负面经济后果,本文考察了拥有媒体从业背景的董秘是否可以减少企业的财务重述行为。研究发现,当公司的董秘拥有媒体从业背景时,公司的财务重述行为显著更少。在一系列稳健检验和考虑内生性的影响之后,上述发现仍然成立。进一步研究发现,媒体背景董秘增加新闻媒体对公司的报道及提高管理层自愿性信息披露准确性是两个可能的影响渠道。最后,资本市场利益相关者对此做出了积极的反应,具体地,媒体背景的董秘其所属公司的估值更高,股权和债权融资成本更低。研究表明,媒体行业所特有的职业特点会促使媒体人在担任公司董秘时依然遵从独立公正的操守,在信息披露中发挥重要作用。

As a communication bridge between listed companies and external stakeholders, information disclosure and investor relation management are the most important functions of board secretaries. According to the upper-echelons theory, the duty performance and behavioral decisions of board secretaries are affected by their background characteristics. In view of the serious consequences of financial restatements and their frequent occurrence, the search for the causes of financial restatements has become the focus of attention in practical and academic circles. The existing literature usually studies both internal and external factors, but little attention has been paid to the possible role played by board secretaries — the combination of aforementioned internal and external governance mechanisms, the intermediary in the information disclosure process, and the information publisher, in financial restatements. Therefore, this paper examines whether board secretaries with media experience can reduce financial restatement behaviors.

Using the Logit regression model, this paper selects all the non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2001 to 2020 as the research sample, and finds that companies have significantly less financial restatement behaviors when their board secretaries have media experience. After a series of robustness tests and endogeneity tests, the above finding still holds. Further research finds that increased news media coverage and increased accuracy of voluntary disclosure are two possible channels. Finally, this paper finds that stakeholders in the capital market make a positive response to this. Specifically, board secretaries with media experience have higher valuation of their companies and lower financing costs of both equity and debt capital.

This paper suggests that the unique professional characteristics of the media industry may motivate media professionals to remain independent and impartial in their role as the board secretary and play an important role in information disclosure. It not only supplements the literature on the impact of board secretaries’ professional background on information disclosure, but also expands the literature in the field of upper-echelons theory, and enriches the literature related to financial restatements. In practice, the findings suggest that the active role of board secretaries needs to be emphasized and brought into play in corporate governance, and professional background and experience should be carefully considered when hiring board secretaries, so as to better serve corporate governance and better perform the functions of board secretaries in information disclosure and investor relation management.

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