会计稳健性能够传染吗?——网络中心度的视角

Can Accounting Conservatism Be Contagious? Analysis from the Perspective of Network Centrality

赵岩,侯锐,陈翼

2020 第 42 卷 第 08 期 页码 139-152

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20200508.201

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摘要

稳健性作为会计基本原则之一,要求企业在面临好消息时要比面临坏消息时的态度更加谨慎,不过高估计资产或收益,也不低估负债和费用。文章以具有会计背景的独立董事连锁现象为视角考察会计稳健性的网络传染效应。基于我国沪深A股2004—2017年上市公司的相关数据进行研究,文章研究发现:由于存在会计背景的独立董事兼任,连锁公司的会计稳健性会表现出相似性,即会计稳健性的传染效应,且董事的网络中心度越高,传染效应也越明显。进一步研究发现,市场化水平较高地区的传染效应明显,国有企业所表现出的传染效应显著强于非国有企业。文章运用网络中心度量化董事连锁程度,丰富了网络视角下公司治理的相关研究。

As a traditional principle, conservatism principle is also known as prudence principle. It refers to the fact that in the market economy, due to the great risks and uncertainties the economic activities of enterprises are faced with, the conservatism principle generally summarized as “expecting possible loss, but not expecting possible income” is usually upheld by enterprises. As it is reflected in the accounting treatment, we ought to hold a conservative attitude (cautious attitude) towards the recognition of revenue, expense or loss. Specifically, possible losses or liabilities should be fully estimated, while possible revenues or gains should not be generally recognized, or must be estimated with great care. Accounting conservatism was first proposed by Basu in 1997 from the perspective of empirical study. Since then, the definition of accounting conservatism has been gradually accepted by scholars and constantly revised in practice. Accounting conservatism requires enterprises to be more cautious when facing good news than when facing bad news, that is, they should not underestimate assets or earnings, nor underestimate liabilities and expenses. Independent directors with accounting background can reasonably use their professional judgment to measure the degree of conservatism of accounting recognition. This paper examines the network contagion effect of accounting conservatism from the perspective of the chain phenomenon of independent directors with accounting background. Based on the relevant data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares in China from 2004 to 2017, it finds that, due to the concurrent appointment of independent directors with accounting background, the accounting conservatism of interlock companies share similarities (that is the contagious effect of account), that is, when different companies have the same directors, accounting conservatism between companies share a certain numerical similarity, and the higher the network centrality of directors is, the more significant the contagious effect is. Through further research, we find that the contagious effect is obvious in areas with high level of marketization, the possible reason is that the regions with high marketization level have higher efficiency of information transmission, so companies in such environment are also more sensitive to the processing and feedback of heterogeneous information; The contagious effect of state-owned enterprises is significantly larger than that of non-state-owned enterprises, the possible reason is that the diversified management of private enterprises weakens the contagious effect caused by the chain of directors. From the perspective of sociology, this paper uses the network centrality to measure the degree of director interlocks, which enriches the related researches on corporate governance from a network perspective. In fact, there are a lot of paths between directors for information transmission. However, limited by data sources, our research cannot obtain and quantify all the social relations of each director, nor can it accurately investigate all the channels of information transmission among directors. In future research work, the other similar characteristics between companies caused by board interlocks can be further researched.

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