避免“煮熟的鸭子飞走”:CEO家族属性、伪禀赋效应与并购溢价

Avoid “a Cooked Duck Flying Away”: CEO Family Attributes, Pseudo-endowment Effect, and M&A Premiums

王晓颖,贾银华,马真真

2021 第 43 卷 第 06 期 页码 74-89

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20210409.202

PDF全文下载 HTML全文

摘要

“煮熟的鸭子飞走了”通常被用来形容并购失败事件,那么企业是否会为了避免“煮熟的鸭子飞走”而进行溢价支付?本文利用CEO家族属性作为伪禀赋效应个体异质性的代理变量,基于2003—2018年中国上市企业1321个溢价并购事件,采用两阶段最小二乘法(IV-2SLS)进行回归估计,研究发现:与职业经理人担任CEO的企业相比,家族成员担任CEO的企业支付的并购溢价更高,即CEO伪禀赋效应在并购中发挥了重要作用;竞争者越多、并购相对重要性越高,或者并购持续时间越长,都会进一步提高家族CEO支付的并购溢价水平。本研究从个体行为理论视角出发,为并购溢价的成因提供了一个新的理论解释,丰富并深化了并购定价决策的有关研究,同时拓展了家族企业的研究边界。

Mergers and acquisitions(M&As)are an important channel for Chinese companies to acquire strategic assets and improve their competitiveness. Wind statistics show that the amount of domestic M&As in China has increased from 28.2 billion yuan in 2001 to 2, 211.8 billion yuan in 2019, and the total scale of M&As has increased by 7798%. Among them, more than 70% of transactions ended with M&As. That is, the price paid by M&A companies is higher than the market value of target companies. M&A premiums are also common in developed countries, ranging from 30% to 50%. However, most M&A companies will experience a decline in stock prices or lower earnings after overpaid M&As, which is the “winners’ curse”. Even so, why are a large number of companies still willing to pay a premium? In M&A-related news, reporters often describe M&A failure as “a cooked duck flying away”. Will companies pay a premium to avoid “a cooked duck flying away”? From the perspective of CEO individual psychological deviation, this paper holds that the buyer CEO psychological ownership deviation is one of the causes of M&A premiums. Psychological ownership deviation effect(or pseudo-endowment effect)refers to an individual systematic behavior deviation that is willing to overpay due to avoiding the loss of the future ownership of the target. Before the announcement of M&As, the CEO of M&A companies will invest a lot of resources to screen, interview and investigate target companies. In other words, the opportunity cost of giving up the “cooked duck” is prohibitively high. To avoid such potential losses, the CEO’s willingness to pay is likely to be higher than the market value of target companies. Furthermore, according to the principal-agent theory and the social-emotional wealth theory, family CEOs are more likely to have psychological ownership of target companies, and their loss aversion is stronger. Therefore, family CEOs will perform a stronger pseudo-endowment effect than professional CEOs(non-family CEOs). Based on 1, 321 M&A premium events of China’s A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2018, this paper uses CEO family attributes as the proxy variable of the heterogeneity of pseudo-endowment effect, and uses the IV-2SLS estimation method to control the potential endogenous problems. The result finds that:(1)Compared with non-family CEO companies, family CEO companies will pay higher M&A premiums.(2)The more the potential competitors, the larger the relative scale of M&As, or the longer the duration of M&As, the stronger the positive correlation between CEO family attributes and M&A premiums. This paper breaks through the traditional theoretical framework based on the assumption of rationality and rational expectation. Starting from the important fact of ownership transfer, this paper explores the impact of CEO individual cognitive bias on its M&A pricing decision, and provides a new theoretical perspective for the abnormal phenomenon of premiums. It not only expands the research boundary of M&A premiums and family business, but also has practical implications for companies to improve the accuracy of M&A pricing. First of all, family CEO companies need to take measures to reduce the individual cognitive bias of CEOs, such as increasing the voice of independent directors or employing professional third-party evaluation agencies. Second, when the scale of M&As is larger or the duration is longer, the willingness to pay of professional CEOs is more rational, and their decision-making efficiency is higher than that of family CEOs.

参考文献

2 傅超, 杨曾, 傅代国. “同伴效应”影响了企业的并购商誉吗?——基于我国创业板高溢价并购的经验证据[J]. 中国软科学,2015, (11): 94-108. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1002-9753.2015.11.010
4 刘白璐, 吕长江. 基于长期价值导向的并购行为研究——以我国家族企业为证据[J]. 会计研究,2018, (6): 47-53. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2018.06.007
6 潘爱玲, 刘文楷, 王雪. 管理者过度自信、债务容量与并购溢价[J]. 南开管理评论,2018, 21(3): 35-45. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1008-3448.2018.03.005
8 于洪鉴, 陈艳, 陈邑早. CEO自恋与并购非公开环节行为决策的实验研究[J]. 管理科学,2019, 32(5): 102-112. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1008-7540.2019.05.021
12 Anderson R C, Mansi S A, Reeb D M. Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2003, 68(2): 263-285. DOI:10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00067-9
13 Ariely D, Simonson I. Buying, bidding, playing, or competing? Value assessment and decision dynamics in online auctions[J]. Journal of Consumer Psychology,2003, 13(1-2): 113-123. DOI:10.1207/S15327663JCP13-1&2_10
14 Brosnan S F, Jones O D, Gardner M, et al. Evolution and the expression of biases: Situational value changes the endowment effect in chimpanzees[J]. Evolution and Human Behavior,2012, 33(4): 378-386. DOI:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.11.009
15 Chatterjee P, Irmak C, Rose R L. The endowment effect as self-enhancement in response to threat[J]. Journal of Consumer Research,2013, 40(3): 460-476. DOI:10.1086/671344
16 Devers C E, Wuorinen S, McNamara G, et al. An integrative review of the emerging behavioral acquisition literature: Charting the next decade of research[J]. Academy of Management Annals,2020, 14(2): 869-907. DOI:10.5465/annals.2018.0031
17 Eckbo B E. Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2009, 15(1): 149-178. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.016
18 Fralich R, Papadopoulos A. The financial crisis, acquisition premiums and the moderating effect of CEO power[J]. Long Range Planning,2018, 51(2): 204-218. DOI:10.1016/j.lrp.2017.08.004
19 Gómez-Mejía L R, Haynes K T, Núñez-Nickel M, et al. Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,2007, 52(1): 106-137. DOI:10.2189/asqu.52.1.106
20 Gomez-Mejia L R, Patel P C, Zellweger T M. In the horns of the dilemma: Socioemotional wealth, financial wealth, and acquisitions in family firms[J]. Journal of Management,2018, 44(4): 1369-1397. DOI:10.1177/0149206315614375
21 Hayward M L A, Hambrick D C. Explaining the premiums paid for large acquisitions: Evidence of CEO hubris[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1997, 42(1): 103-127. DOI:10.2307/2393810
22 Heyman J E, Orhun Y, Ariely D. Auction fever: The effect of opponents and quasi-endowment on product valuations[J]. Journal of Interactive Marketing,2004, 18(4): 7-21. DOI:10.1002/dir.20020
23 Kim H, Hoskisson R E, Zyung J D. Socioemotional favoritism: Evidence from foreign divestitures in family multinationals[J]. Organization Studies,2019, 40(6): 917-940. DOI:10.1177/0170840619838955
25 Shu S B, Peck J. Psychological ownership and affective reaction: Emotional attachment process variables and the endowment effect[J]. Journal of Consumer Psychology,2011, 21(4): 439-452. DOI:10.1016/j.jcps.2011.01.002
26 Thaler R H. Anomalies: The winner's curse[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,1988, 2(1): 191-202. DOI:10.1257/jep.2.1.191
28 Tversky A, Kahneman D. Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1991, 106(4): 1039-1061. DOI:10.2307/2937956
29 Villalonga B, Amit R. How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006, 80(2): 385-417. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.005