国企高管晋升激励与超额现金持有价值

The Effect of Promotion on the Value of Excess Cash Holdings: Evidence from SOEs in China

刘猛,张晨宇,叶陈刚,陈彦亮

2020 第 42 卷 第 02 期 页码 97-110

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20191225.002

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摘要

本文基于现金持有价值视角,以优序融资理论和代理理论为基础,考察了外部投资者对国企高管晋升激励行为的反应。研究发现,国企高管面临晋升激励时,外部投资者对公司持有的超额现金给予折价,超额现金持有价值显著减少,这说明超额现金持有体现了晋升高管的“代理观”。产品市场竞争与投资者保护作为公司治理机制的重要组成,有效地降低了晋升高管的超额现金持有,缓解了外部投资者对超额现金持有价值的折价。进一步研究表明,晋升高管更可能利用超额现金从事过度投资、低质量并购等非现金分红活动。本文研究说明晋升激励并未有效缓解股东与管理层之间的代理冲突,研究结论对于当前推进的国企改革具有重要的政策启示。

On the basis of the optimal sequence financing theory and the agency theory, this paper examines how external investors react to the promotion incentive behavior of SOE executives from the perspective of excess cash holdings. This study finds that the association between political promotion and the value of excess cash holdings is negative. The finding shows that when there is a promotion incentive for executives, external investors give discount to the value of excess cash holdings and the value of excess cash holdings significantly reduce, suggesting that excess cash holdings reflect the “agency view” of promoted executives, and the excess cash reflects the opportunistic motivation of executives, which means that executives are more likely to grab personal interests through cash. The corporate governance mechanism can alleviate the agency problem between managers and shareholders, and improve firm value. We use product market competition and investor protection to measure the corporate governance, and find that product market competition and investor protection are important corporate governance mechanisms. Strong product market competition and investor protection can effectively reduce the excess cash holdings of promoted executives, and alleviate the discount of outside investors to the value of excess cash holdings. Furthermore, we examine how the excess cash held by promoted executives is used to satisfy private benefits. The assessment and promotion mechanism of SOE executives is still “scale oriented”, and the larger the company is, the more resources executives can use for private benefits. We predict and find that SOE executives have strong motivations to extend the scale of firms and are more likely to use the excess cash to do inefficient investments rather than pay cash dividends to shareholders, and the SOEs whose executives have the chance to promote to higher positions are more likely to engage in low quality M&As, but these activities damage shareholders’ wealth, and external investors are more likely to give negative reactions. All of these findings show that the cash holding behavior of political promotion companies reflects its agency problem, which supports the free cash flow hypothesis. The association between political promotion and the value of excess cash holdings is still established when we use Propensity Score Matching, instrumental variables and other robustness test methods. Overall, political promotion executives use firms’ resources to pursue private benefits, and exacerbate agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. The findings can help us to enhance the understanding of incentive effects of political promotion, and have an important policy suggestion for the SOE reform and job market building.

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