CEO获奖与企业创新:基于信任治理的视角

CEO Awards and Firm Innovation: From the Perspective of Trust Governance

李江雁,邹立凯

2022 第 44 卷 第 08 期 页码 73-89

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20220409.202

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摘要

本文基于权威媒体为企业CEO颁发的“最佳CEO”等奖项,探究CEO获奖对企业创新投入的影响。基于2006—2018年中国民营上市公司数据,本文采用双重差分(DID)回归模型进行实证检验,结果表明:相较于获奖前,CEO获奖后其所在企业的创新投入显著增加。同时,CEO获奖后薪酬绩效敏感度降低,担任董事长职位的概率提高。进一步分析这一治理变化的调节作用,发现当CEO获奖后的薪酬绩效敏感度较低时或担任董事长职位后,CEO获奖与企业创新投入的正向关系更强,获得股东更高程度的信任和更宽松的治理环境能够促进CEO获奖后更愿意进行创新投入。本文研究结论有助于深入认识媒体授予的社会奖项在公司治理中的作用,对如何提高以CEO为代表的职业经理人创新积极性具有重要意义。

Under the governance structure of the separation of ownership and management right, the principal-agent problem has been perplexing shareholders and the board of directors. Relevant researches point out that CEO media awards may have positive incentives or negative effects, so there are no consistent results on the governance effect about CEOs winning the media awards. Firms’ innovation research and development is a kind of activity that has the characteristics of a large amount of capital investment, high uncertainty, high risk and long return cycle. However, professional managers usually have short-sighted behaviors, thereby hindering innovation investment, and then affect economic benefits and future development. According to the principal-agent theory, when the personal interests of professional managers are related to the long-term performance of firms, the strategic investment conducive to the long-term development of firms will be increased, such as innovation investment. Therefore, it is particularly important for firms to effectively mitigate the short-sighted tendencies of CEOs. This paper intends to supplement the research on CEO media awards in terms of innovation behavior. As important decision-makers, after receiving authoritative media awards, whether CEOs can win more recognition and trust from shareholders and the board of directors, and then stimulate award-winning CEOs’ innovation enthusiasm so as to promote them to carry out more innovative behaviors, is the main focus of this paper.

Based on the data of Chinese privately-owned listed firms from 2006 to 2018, this paper empirically tests the hypotheses by using DID regressions combined with PSM to verify the impact of CEO media awards on innovation investment. The results show that firms with award-winning CEOs experience a significant increase in innovation investment in the post-award period, and award-winning CEOs enjoy lower compensation-performance elasticity and are more likely to become chairmen in the post-award period than in the pre-award period. This paper further analyzes the moderating effect of the change of governance, and finds that compensation-performance elasticity (becoming chairman) in the post-award period weakens (strengthens) the effect of CEO awards on innovation investment, and enhanced trust from shareholders and less strict governance environment may be the important drivers of award-winning CEOs’ increase in innovation investment.

Compared with existing researches, this paper mainly has the following contribution: First, it reveals that “The Best CEO” awards for professional managers have positive effects on innovation investment by taking CEO awards as an opportunity event. Second, it expands the explanatory mechanism for how CEO awards affect the behaviors and decisions of award-winning shareholders. It is found that the spillover effect of media awards can enhance the long-term decision-making of award-winning CEOs by affecting the trust and restriction degree of shareholders and the board of directors on CEOs, such as reducing compensation-performance elasticity and enhancing career height. Third, it identifies some external factors that affect the innovation motivation of professional managers, which has certain practical and policy significance to the realistic business management. This paper enlightens that firms should pay more attention to the role of some non-economic rewards for managers, and they can rationally use the role of media evaluation mechanism in corporate governance.

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