金融资产配置的同伴效应与企业违规——来自2007—2018年非金融上市公司的经验证据

Peer Effects of Financial Asset Allocation and Corporate Fraud: Empirical Evidence of Listed Non-financial Companies from 2007 to 2018

董盈厚,马亚民,董馨格

2021 第 43 卷 第 08 期 页码 88-104

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20210610.201

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摘要

经济新常态背景下,现有企业金融化的研究主要基于公司独立决策假设展开,较少探讨社会互动因素的作用。本文以2007—2018年非金融上市公司为样本,基于同伴效应视角,依托行业与地区,研究金融资产配置与企业违规关系。控制异方差、采用2SLS与Bivariate Probit估计方法处理内生性后的基本回归分析发现,金融资产配置存在同伴效应,能够增加企业违规概率与违规程度;机制检验证实,金融资产配置同伴效应会降低市场信息透明度,进而正向影响企业违规。在进一步研究中,区分金融资产配置类型后发现,金融资产配置同伴效应导致企业违规主要是长期金融资产配置同伴效应发挥作用;违规动机分析发现,金融资产配置同伴效应会增强企业套利、盈余管理与利益侵占动机;外部冲击分析发现,受企业金融化监管政策影响,金融资产配置同伴效应的正向作用在2012年之后更显著。研究结论有助于理解目前我国经济“脱实向虚”扰乱资本市场的内在逻辑,为引导金融服务实体经济、防范违规风险提供进一步的经验证据。

Under the new normal economy, the real economy continues to weaken and the virtual economy continues to expand, which leads to financialization. Financialization is not only related to the sustainable development of the main business, but also may affect economic operation risks through the “systematic risk linkage mechanism”. It is highly valued by the Party and the government, and widely concerned by academia. The existing literature on financialization is mainly based on the assumption of independent corporate decision-making, and rarely discusses the role of social interaction factors. However, due to the uncertainty of economic prospects, information costs and so on, the decision-making of corporate behavior will be affected by other actors in the embedded social environment. Relying on industries and regions, this paper takes the annual data of all listed non-financial companies from 2007 to 2018 as samples to test the impact of financial asset allocation on corporate fraud from the perspective of peer effects. Moreover, this paper provides an explanation for the relationship between the two from the perspective of market information transparency. Eliminating heteroscedasticity and addressing endogenous concerns with 2SLS and the Bivariate Probit method, the results show that financial asset allocation has obvious peer effects. That is, companies will imitate the financial investment decisions of peer companies in the same industry but in different regions, in the same region but in different industries and in the same industry and region, which will increase the probability and extent of corporate fraud; the transmission path is that peer effects of financial asset allocation will reduce market information transparency and thus positively affect corporate fraud. After distinguishing the types of financial asset allocation, it is found that the peer effects of long-term financial assets play a major role; after analyzing corporate fraud motives, it is found that the peer effects of financial asset allocation will enhance arbitrage, earnings management, and benefit expropriation motives; in terms of external shocks, it is found that the positive relationship between the peer effects of financial asset allocation and corporate fraud has been strengthen after 2012. The findings indicate that financialization has a contagious effect, which will amplify asset bubbles, cause financial speculation, and increase market frictions, thereby increasing the difficulty of supervision, reducing the probability of being audited, enhancing corporate fraud motives, and ultimately leading to frequent corporate fraud. In theory, the conclusions can deepen the research on financialization, enrich the “investment-centric theory”, and provide further empirical evidence for the fraud triangle theory. In practice, the conclusions can help market participants understand the internal logic of China’s current economic “from real to virtual” disrupting the capital market, and provide reference for regulatory authorities to further promote financial marketization reform, guide financial services to the real economy, weaken cross-industry arbitrage and other motives, and prevent illegal risks. At the same time, it is helpful for financial market information intermediaries to clarify the harmfulness of peer effects of financial asset allocation, effectively tap the fundamental information of companies, improve the efficiency of market information, and help the governance of violations.

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