商誉减值企业印象管理与研发支出资本化——来自2007—2021年A股上市公司的经验证据
Impression Management of Goodwill Impairment Firms and R&D Expenditure Capitalization: Empirical Evidence from 2007-2021 A-Share Listed Companies
DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20230831.201
[1]董馨格,韩亮亮,董盈厚.商誉减值企业印象管理与研发支出资本化——来自2007—2021年A股上市公司的经验证据[J/OL].外国经济与管理,2024,46(05):86-103[2026-11-20].https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20230831.201.
摘要
借助2007—2021年A股上市公司数据,基于研发支出资本化视角,本文研究商誉减值企业的印象管理手段及效果。研究发现,商誉减值企业增加研发资本化及操纵动力随商誉减值程度升高而降低。机制研究表明,研发资本化传递盈利与融资能力增强和溢出效应的积极信号,这一功能有助于提升商誉减值企业的正面印象,利好信号失效、内部控制和声誉损失厌恶为商誉减值企业降低研发资本化提供解释。异质性研究发现,分析师预测偏差和业绩承诺制度削弱了企业增加研发资本化及操纵意愿,媒体正面报道则起相反作用。文章揭示了商誉减值企业印象管理与会计行为的内在逻辑,拓展了商誉减值经济后果的理论探索与经验证据,为健全企业合并的财务信息治理机制、完善研发支出会计准则提供有益启示。
The credibility of firms gradually collapses with the increase of goodwill impairment, so recovering the loss of reputation and stock price caused by goodwill impairment has become the top priority of operation and management. Previous studies show that firms use earnings management in advance to avoid and delay goodwill impairment provision, or use high headroom to hide the recognition of large-scale goodwill impairment, so as to reduce the risk of stock price crash, mitigate negative market reactions, and avoid conflicts with stakeholders. However, there is little literature exploring the post-event behavior to deal with the negative impact of goodwill impairment. This paper intends to investigate this issue from the perspective of impression management.
Based on the sample of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021, this paper explores the means and effect of the impression management of goodwill impairment firms from the perspective of R&D expenditure capitalization. The study finds that the momentum of increasing R&D expenditure capitalization and manipulation of goodwill impairment firms decreases as the degree of goodwill impairment increases. Mechanism research shows that R&D expenditure capitalization can release signals that alleviate the negative economic consequences of goodwill impairment, improve the transparency of R&D information, and enhance the ability of industry information disclosure, as well as increase the positive market response of goodwill impairment firms. This function provides an explanation for the increase of R&D expenditure capitalization of goodwill impairment firms. Heterogeneity research shows that analyst forecast bias and performance commitment system weaken the willingness of goodwill impairment firms to increase R&D expenditure capitalization and manipulation, while positive media coverage is counterproductive.
This paper has the following contributions: First, it reveals the impression management behavior of goodwill impairment firms using R&D expenditure capitalization and manipulation, expanding the theoretical exploration of the earnings manipulation and reputation enhancement strategies of goodwill impairment firms. Second, it shows that investors of lower goodwill impairment firms have the investment psychology of “placebo effect”, revealing the reasons why investors are difficult to identify the true information of goodwill impairment firms and their risk prevention abilities are insufficient. Third, it shows that there are still functional deficiencies in external information governance, emphasizing the importance of internal control risk management and the effectiveness of financial statements, which provides new evidence and inspirations for improving the internal and external optimization mechanism of the R&D information disclosure of goodwill impairment firms in China, as well as for regulatory authorities to guide information intermediaries to disseminate true information.
关键词: 商誉减值,研发支出资本化,印象管理,信号传递,损失厌恶