卖空约束放松能够改善企业劳动投资效率吗?

Can the Relaxation of Short Selling Constraint Improve Firms’ Labor Investment Efficiency?

褚剑,方军雄

2020 第 42 卷 第 02 期 页码 84-96

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20190703.002

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摘要

本文从卖空约束放松角度考察其对企业劳动投资效率的影响,研究发现,卖空约束放松后,企业的劳动投资效率得到明显改善,并且这一效应在企业股价信息含量或会计信息质量较低时更为明显。进一步地,卖空约束放松主要是缓解了企业劳动投资不足而非劳动投资过度,这种非对称性可能源于《劳动合同法》出台后劳动保护的增强以及由此引发的企业减员增效难度加大,而上述劳动投资不足的减少则是源于卖空机制对企业融资约束和管理松弛的缓解。并且,卖空机制促使劳动投资不足的企业增加了对高人力资本员工的雇佣,进而改善了人力资本配置效率,最终提升了全要素生产率。本文的上述重要发现对当前供给侧结构性改革中如何更好地发挥市场机制创新在劳动力要素资源配置中的决定性作用,从而提高全要素生产率、促进经济社会持续健康发展具有重要启示。

In the context of China’s economic development having entered the new normal, it has become an important task to improve the efficiency of enterprise human capital allocation to deepen the supply-side structural reform. However, existing literature focuses on firms’ capital investment efficiency but ignores the labor investment efficiency. Moreover, early literature mainly studies the excessive employment in state-owned enterprise due to government intervention and the distortion of enterprise operation and management activities due to the strengthening of labor protection in Labor Contract Law of 2008. But improving firms’ labor investment efficiency fundamentally depends on the market playing a decisive role in resource allocation. As an innovation of the capital market trading system, the margin trading and short selling system implemented in China in 2010 is increasingly playing the role of market price discovery for the increase of stock price information content and corporate governance for the improvement of financial reporting quality, which will undoubtedly significantly promote firms to optimize the allocation of human capital and improve the labor investment efficiency. Therefore, this paper studies the impact of short selling on firms’ labor investment efficiency. We find that firms’ labor investment efficiency improves after the relaxation of short selling constraint. And this phenomenon is more significant for firms with low stock price informativeness or financial reporting quality. Further, there is an asymmetry for the improved labor investment efficiency, that is, only firms’ labor under-investment not labor over-investment is reduced. This asymmetry results from Labor Contract Law, which increases labor protection and makes it difficult to fire employees and reduce labor investment to achieve the optimal level justified by economic fundamentals. And short selling reduces labor under-investment by releasing financial constraint and managerial slack. In addition, short selling helps these under-investment firms allocate more employees with high human capital and eventually achieve higher total factor productivity. Overall, these findings not only enrich the research in the fields of enterprise investment decision, the influencing factors of labor investment efficiency, and the economic consequences of short selling, but also have important implications on how to give full play to the decisive role of market mechanism innovation in the allocation of labor resources, so as to enhance total factor productivity and promote sustained and healthy economic and social development in the current supply-side structural reform.

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