定向增发、契约特征与大股东资金占用

Private Placement, Contract Characteristics and Shareholders’ Embezzlement of Funds

刘超,阮永平,郑凯

2020 第 42 卷 第 06 期 页码 126-138

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20191210.003

PDF全文下载 HTML全文

摘要

已有文献对于定向增发中大股东的掏空研究主要聚焦于发行时的折扣率上,而鲜有考虑大股东对定向增发资金占用的问题。本文以2007—2017年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了定增方案的实施及其不同契约特征对大股东资金占用行为的影响。研究发现:(1)定向增发后,大股东资金占用程度显著提高。(2)定增折扣率越高,大股东后续资金占用现象越严重。(3)而相对于现金认购,资产认购下的大股东掏空动机更强。(4)当有机构投资者参与时,可以有效抑制大股东的这种掏空行为。最后,本文还探讨了大股东资金占用的可能途径,发现定向增发后大股东与上市公司之间的关联交易显著增加,而且关联交易规模越大,资金占用现象也越严重。本文丰富了定向增发中大股东利益输送的文献,而且在定增新规出台后对于大股东更多掏空行为的监管具有重要的政策含义。

Using firm-level data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies of private placement in China from 2007 to 2017, this paper examines the effects of private placement and the different contract characteristics on shareholder expropriation by the DID regression model. The results show that:(1)Funds occupied by large shareholders significantly increase after private placement.(2)The higher the price discount, the more serious the phenomenon of subsequent capital occupation by major shareholders.(3)Compared to cash subscription, large shareholders have stronger motivation of tunneling under asset subscription.(4)The participation of institutional investors could effectively suppress the tunneling behavior of major shareholders. Finally, this paper also discusses the possible ways of capital occupation by controlling shareholders. Research shows that the related party transactions between major shareholders and listed companies increase significantly after private placement, and the larger the related party transactions, the more serious the tunneling of capital occupation.

The contributions of this paper are as follows: Firstly, this paper transfers the study of tunneling behavior of large shareholders from the initial issuance part to the subsequent appropriation of funds, and more clearly reveals the interests transmission behavior of large shareholders in the process of private placement, which greatly enriches the literature of private placement. Secondly, this paper adopts the most commonly used index to measure the tunneling of major shareholders, namely capital occupation, and finds that the higher the discount rate is, the more serious the subsequent funds occupation of major shareholders will be. Thus, it provides new empirical evidence for the logical relationship between the discount rate and the tunneling behavior of major shareholders, and makes up for the deficiency of existing theories. Thirdly, The conclusions also have important policy implications. In the post-private placement era, effective governance on other tunneling means of major shareholders is of great policy significance to both investors and regulatory authorities.

参考文献

1 陈耿, 杜烽. 控股大股东与定向增发价格: 隧道效应、利益协同效应及其相互影响[J]. 南方经济,2012, (6): 32-43. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1000-6249.2012.06.003
3 何丽梅. 我国上市公司定向增发折价研究——基于较完整市场周期的分析[J]. 经济管理,2010, (2): 144-151. DOI:10.3969/J.ISSN.1008-3154.2010.02.049
5 姜付秀, 蔡欣妮, 朱冰. 多个大股东与股价崩盘风险[J]. 会计研究,2018, (1): 68-74. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2018.01.011
6 李昊洋, 程小可, 姚立杰. 机构投资者调研抑制了公司避税行为吗?——基于信息披露水平中介效应的分析[J]. 会计研究,2018, (9): 56-63. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2018.09.008
11 章卫东, 李德忠. 定向增发新股折扣率的影响因素及其与公司短期股价关系的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 会计研究,2008, (9): 73-80. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2008.09.010
13 赵国宇. 大股东控制下的股权融资与掏空行为研究[J]. 管理评论,2013, (6): 24-30, 103. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.2095-3410.2013.06.003
18 Boone A L, White J T. The effect of institutional ownership on firm transparency and information production[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2015, 117(3): 508-533. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.05.008
19 Brav A, Jiang W, Partnoy F, et al. Hedge fund activism, corporate governance, and firm performance[J]. The Journal of Finance,2008, 63(4): 1729-1775. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01373.x
20 Cheung Y L, Rau P R, Stouraitis A. Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: Evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2006, 82(2): 343-386. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.08.012
21 Jiang G H, Lee C M C, Yue H. Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2010, 98(1): 1-20. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.05.002
22 Jiang G H, Rao P G, Yue H. Tunneling through non-operational fund occupancy: An investigation based on officially identified activities[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2015, 32: 295-311. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.10.011
23 Johnson S, La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F, et al. Tunneling[J]. American Economic Review,2000, 90(2): 22-27. DOI:10.1257/aer.90.2.22
24 La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F, Shleifer A. Corporate ownership around the world[J]. The Journal of Finance,1999, 54(2): 471-517. DOI:10.1111/0022-1082.00115
25 Lel U, Miller D P. Does takeover activity cause managerial discipline? Evidence from international M&A laws[J]. The Review of Financial Studies,2015, 28(6): 1588-1622. DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhv002
26 Petersen M A. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches[J]. The Review of Financial Studies,2009, 22(1): 435-480. DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhn053
27 Wang K, Xiao X. Controlling shareholders’ tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2011, 30(1): 89-100. DOI:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2010.09.014