内生溢价还是垂直溢价?——基于制度内生选择的跨文化比较视角

Endogeneity or Top-bottom Premium? An Cross-cultural Comparison Perspective Based on Endogenous Institutional Selection

李志云,张文婕,朱宪辰

2017 第 39 卷 第 08 期 页码 115-128

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2017.08.009

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摘要

面对囚徒式社会困境,主流的思路基本是延续着庇古的传统,从机制设计的视角,引入博弈规则(惩或奖)使得局中各方“讲真话”,进而提高合作绩效。但越来越多研究表明“同一博弈规则,与外生强加的相比,由成员参与制定的内生制度下合作水平更高”,即内生溢价。本文聚焦“博弈规则的产生方式”本身促进合作产生溢价现象,述评西方社会中内生溢价普遍存在及其因果机理、场景依赖特征,并围绕东方社会表现出相反的垂直溢价,即外生制度下合作绩效更高,提出因不同文化经历而习得“程序公平正当认同”的研究路径,为解释内生溢价跨文化差异提供更合理的视角,最后在归纳内生制度绩效的研究结论及其局限的基础上,展望了该领域未来研究的可能拓展路径。

In face of prisoners-based social dilemmas, the mainstream theories follow a tradition of Pigou theory, and focus on establishing the game rule (punishment or reward) to make players " telling the truth” for induce them to cooperate from a perspective of institutional design. However, more and more studies show that the effect of the same rule on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen endogenously by group members than when it is exogenously imposed. That is endogeneity premium. This paper focuses on that the ways to establish game rules can promote cooperation resulting in a premium phenomenon. Firstly, it sorts out the relevant field and laboratory findings to indicate the prevalence of endogeneity premium in western society, and also analyzes the causal mechanisms of premium and its context-dependent feature. Secondly, it highlights the existence of cross-cultural differences which means the cooperation performance is higher under exogenously imposed institution in the eastern society. Hereto, it proposes the legitimacy identity based on procedural fairness acquiring from different cultural traditions as the fundamental research route which provide a more reasonable perspective for the interpretation of the cross-cultural differences. Finally, based on a brief summary of research conclusions of endogenous institutional performance and their limitations, this paper makes prospects for the future study.

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