银行高管薪酬的权力诱因与风险后果研究

Research on Power Incentives of the Compensation of Chinese Bank Executives and Risk Consequences

游志郎,余耀东,韩小明,周建

2017 第 39 卷 第 04 期 页码 41-51

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2017.04.004

PDF全文下载 HTML全文

摘要

近年来,中国金融行业高管的天价薪酬引发舆论热议,国内外学者开始探究银行高管薪酬设计的合理性。鉴于学界和业界对银行业高管薪酬科学性的质疑,本文基于中国沪深上市银行2009—2012年的相关数据,探究银行业高管天价薪酬以及高管—员工薪酬差距的成因,并考察其对银行风险的影响。具体来说,本文首先研究了银行高管权力对高管薪酬的影响,在此基础上,探究了银行公司治理水平对高管权力与高管薪酬关系的调节效应。同时,还研究了银行高管薪酬及高管—员工薪酬差距对银行风险的影响。研究发现,在中国上市银行中,高管权力显著促进了高管薪酬水平的提升,而银行治理水平能够负向调节高管权力与高管薪酬的正相关关系,同时银行内部薪酬差距可以诱发银行风险。研究结论表明,中国银行业应当适度削弱高管权力,努力提高银行治理水平,以此确保高管薪酬设计的科学合理性,同时适当缩小高管—员工薪酬差距,以防范薪酬异常差距导致的银行风险。

In recent years, the sky-high compensation of executives in financial industry has aroused heated discussion from the public and scholars at home and abroad has begun to test the reasonability of compensation design of bank executives. Considering the universal skepticism for bank executive compensation, this paper focuses on the reasons for the formation of sky-high compensation of bank executives and compensation gap between executives and employees, as well as their influences on bank risks. Specifically speaking, this paper firstly studies the influence of managerial power on executive compensation in banking. Then it explores the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between managerial power and executive compensation. Finally, it studies the influences of bank executive compensation and compensation gap between executives and employees on bank risks. It concludes that, there is a positive relationship between managerial power and executive compensation in Chinese listed banks, corporate governance of the banks will negatively moderate the positive correlation between managerial power and executive compensation, and compensation gap in internal banks can induce bank risks. These conclusions suggest that the banks should moderately restrain the managerial power and make efforts to improve corporate governance level of banks to ensure the reasonability of executive compensation design, and should reduce the compensation gap reasonably between executives and employees to prevent bank risks caused by the abnormal compensation gap.

参考文献

6 吴育辉, 吴世农. 高管薪酬: 激励还是自利?——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].会计研究, 2010, (11): 40–48. DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2010.11.007
8 Adams J S. Inequity in social exchange[J]. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 1965, 2: 267–299. DOI:10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60108-2
9 Bebchuk L A, Fried J M. Executive compensation as an agency problem[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003, 17(3): 71–92. DOI:10.1257/089533003769204362
10 Bebchuk L A, Fried J M. How to tie equity compensation to long-term results[J]. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 2010, 22(1): 99–106. DOI:10.1111/jacf.2010.22.issue-1
11 Brooks A, Zeitz G. The effects of total quality management and perceived justice on organizational commitment of hospital nursing staff[J]. Journal of Quality Management, 1999, 4(1): 69–93. DOI:10.1016/S1084-8568(99)80096-0
12 Chen J J, Liu X G, Li W A. The effect of insider control and global benchmarks on Chinese executive compensation[J]. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2010, 18(2): 107–123. DOI:10.1111/corg.2010.18.issue-2
13 Cordeiro J J, He L R, Conyon M, et al. Informativeness of performance measures and Chinese executive compensation[J]. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 2013, 30(4): 1031–1058. DOI:10.1007/s10490-013-9353-9
14 Cordeiro J, He L R, Conyon M, et al. Chinese executive compensation: the role of asymmetric performance benchmarks[J]. The European Journal of Finance, 2016, 22(4-6): 484–505. DOI:10.1080/1351847X.2013.769892
15 Fahlenbrach R, Stulz R M. Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2011, 99(1): 11–26. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.010
16 Finkelstein S. Power in top management teams: Dimensions, measurement, and validation[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1992, 35(3): 505–538. DOI:10.2307/256485
17 Hagendorff J, Vallascas F. CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011, 17(4): 1078–1095. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.009
18 Kato T, Long C. Executive compensation, firm performance, and corporate governance in China: Evidence from firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges[J]. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2006, 54(4): 945–983. DOI:10.1086/503583
19 Korsgaard M A, Schweiger D M, Sapienza H J. Building commitment, attachment, and trust in strategic decision-making teams: The role of procedural justice[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1995, 38(1): 60–84. DOI:10.2307/256728
20 Luo Y L, Jackson D. Executive compensation, ownership structure and firm performance in Chinese financial corporations[J]. Global Business and Finance Review, 2012, 17(1): 56–74.
21 Malmendier U, Tate G. CEO overconfidence and corporate investment[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2005a, 60(6): 2661–2700. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x
22 Malmendier U, Tate G. Does overconfidence affect corporate investment? CEO overconfidence measures revisited[J]. European Financial Management, 2005b, 11(5): 649–659. DOI:10.1111/eufm.2005.11.issue-5
23 Sakawa H, Moriyama K, Watanabel N. Relation between top executive compensation structure and corporate governance: Evidence from Japanese public disclosed data[J]. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2012, 20(6): 593–608. DOI:10.1111/corg.2012.20.issue-6