制度情境与企业违规:基于跨国面板数据的实证研究

Institutional Context and Firm Misbehavior: An Empirical Research Based on Cross-national Panel Data

周俊

2017 第 39 卷 第 03 期 页码 114-128

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2017.03.009

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摘要

企业违规是阻碍经济和社会良性发展的“毒瘤”,因此,探讨企业违规的前因和发生机理以便有效地防范企业违规就显得十分必要。现有研究大多关注个人层面和情境层面的前因,而忽视了更为重要的系统层面的制度前因。本文运用制度失范理论,利用来自152个国家(地区)2009—2015年间的面板数据,着重探讨作为系统重要组成部分的社会制度元素——政策与法律环境对企业违规的影响效应,并分析另一种社会制度元素——教育对该效应的调节作用。主要的实证结果如下:其一,一国(地区)的裙带主义与其企业违规程度显著正相关,而政府决策透明度、法律解决纠纷的效率以及警务可靠性均与企业违规程度显著负相关。其二,教育质量不仅直接抑制企业违规,而且显著地正向调节了警务可靠性与企业违规程度之间的负相关关系。本文是国内较早运用跨国面板数据对企业违规的制度前因进行探究的实证成果,所引入的制度失范视角在企业违规研究领域具有广阔的应用空间。本文结论对一国(地区)企业违规的治理亦具有较强的实践意义。

Firm misbehavior is cancerous to the sound development of economy and society. Therefore, it is very essential to explore the antecedents and occurrence mechanisms of firm misbehavior to effectively prevent it. Existing researches mostly focus on the individual-level and contextual-level antecedents, yet ignoring the system-level antecedents which are more important. Based on institutional anomie theory, this paper mainly explores the impact of one kind of social institution, policy and legal environment, which is an important component of the system, on firm misbehavior using panel data from 152 economies during the period of 2009 and 2015. Besides, if explores the moderating roles of education, which is another kind of social institution. The main empirical results are as follows. Firstly, while cronyism is significantly and positively related to firm misbehavior, transparency of government decision-making, efficiency of the legal framework in settling disputes and reliability of police services all display significantly negative relationships with firm misbehavior. Secondly, education quality not only directly inhibits firm misbehavior, but also positively moderates the negative relationship between reliability of police service and firm misbehavior. This paper takes the lead in China to use cross-national panel data to explore the institutional antecedents of firm misbehavior. The institutional anomie theory it introduces has broad space for application in explaining the impact of institutions and culture on firm misbehavior. Our research conclusions have important practical implications for the governance of firm misbehavior.

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