管理层持股与股权资本成本

Management Shareholding and Equity Capital Costs

汪平,王晓娜

2017 第 39 卷 第 02 期 页码 60-71

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2017.02.005

PDF全文下载 HTML全文

摘要

管理层持股计划是现代公司治理的重要内容之一,旨在将管理层利益与股东财富有机地结合在一起,达到保护投资者利益、持续增加股东财富的治理目标。在中国,鉴于国有公司治理自身存在的诸多先天不足,实施管理层持股计划被赋予了更加积极的意义。本文探讨在国有控股与非国有控股状态下,管理层持股比例对股权资本成本的影响。结果显示,管理层持股比例的设计及其变化是管理层持股计划的关键环节,对公司资本成本水平产生直接影响,进而决定着公司综合竞争力的变化;我国国有控股上市公司和非国有控股上市公司的管理层持股比例与股权资本成本均呈倒U形关系;同时,国有控股上市公司的资本成本对于管理层持股比例的变化比非国有控股上市公司更加敏感。这表明,只有基于资本成本的变化来设计管理层的持股比例,才能够保证管理层持股计划的有效性,实现其正向效应。本文为上市公司管理层持股比例的设置提供了理论依据和建设性意见。

Management shareholding plan is an important part of modern corporate governance, and aims to combine management interests with shareholder wealth organically & achieve the governance goals of protecting the interests of investors and increasing the shareholder wealth constantly. In China, the state-owned corporate governance has many congenital defects, so the implementation of management shareholding plan has been given a more positive meaning. This paper explores the influence of the proportion of management shareholding on the costs of equity capital in the state-owned and non-state-owned holding states. It comes to the conclusions as follows:firstly, the design of the proportion of management shareholding and its changes are the key to the management shareholding plan, and have the direct impacts on corporate capital costs, thereby determining the changes in corporate comprehensive competitiveness; secondly, there are inverted U-shape relationships between the proportion of management shareholding and the costs of equity capital in both state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies; thirdly, capital costs are more sensitive to the changes in the proportion of management shareholding in state-owned listed companies than in non-state-owned listed companies. It shows that only the design of the proportion of management shareholding in accordance with changes in capital costs can guarantee the effectiveness of management shareholding plan and play the positive role. It provides listed companies with theoretical basis and constructive suggestions about the design of the proportion of management shareholding.

参考文献

8 吴宏宇. 管理层持股与公司绩效的实证研究[D]. 西南财经大学, 2014.
13 张琛. 中小板上市公司管理层持股与公司绩效关系研究[D]. 浙江理工大学, 2014.
15 Brown L D, Lee Y J. The relation between corporation governance and CEOs' equity grants[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 2010, 29(6):533-558. DOI:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2010.09.008
16 Brockman P, et al. Voluntary disclosures and the exercise of CEO stock options[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2010, 16(1):120-136. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.09.001
17 Berle A A, Means G C. Corporations and the public investor[J]. American Economic Review, 1930, 20(1):54-71.
18 Cheng Q, Warfield T D. Equity incentives and earnings management[J]. The Accounting Review, 2005, 80(2):441-476. DOI:10.2308/accr.2005.80.2.441
19 Easton P D. PE ratios, PEG ratios, and estimating the implied expected rate of return on equity capital[J]. The Accounting Review, 2004, 79(1):73-95. DOI:10.2308/accr.2004.79.1.73
20 Fama E F, Jensen M C. Agency problems and residual claims[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, 26(2):327-349. DOI:10.1086/467038
21 Gebhardt W R, et al. Towards an implied cost of capital[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2001, 39,(1):135-176. DOI:10.1111/1475-679X.00007
22 Gordon M J. The investment, financing and valuation of the corporation[M]. Illinois:Richard D Irwin, Inc, 1962.
23 Jensen M, Meckling W. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3(4):305-360. DOI:10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
24 Kato H K, et al. An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2005, 78(2):435-461. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.001
25 La Porta R, et al. Law and finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1988, 106(6):1113-1115.
26 Mehran H. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1995, 38(2):163-184. DOI:10.1016/0304-405X(94)00809-F
27 Morck R, et al. Management ownership and market valuation:An empirical analysis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20(1-2):293-315.
28 Ohlson J A, Juettner-Nauroth B E. Expected EPS and EPS growth as determinants of value[J]. Review of Accounting Studies, 2005, 10(2-3):349-365. DOI:10.1007/s11142-005-1535-3
29 Stuzlz R M. Managerial control of voting rights:Financing policies and the market for corporate[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20(3):25-54.
30 Sun Q, Tong W H S. China share issue privatization:The extent of its success[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, 70(2):183-222. DOI:10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00145-4
31 Wei Z, et al. Ownership structure and firm value in china's privatized firms:1991-2001[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2005, 40(1):87-108. DOI:10.1017/S0022109000001757