冲突与合作经济治理的契约解决之道——2016年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主主要经济理论贡献述评

Contract Theory for Economic Governance of Conflict and Cooperation:A Review of Main Economic Theory Contributions by 2016 Nobel Economics Prize Laureates

李宝良,郭其友

2016 第 38 卷 第 11 期 页码 115-128

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2016.11.009

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摘要

霍姆斯特罗姆和哈特因其对契约理论所做出的杰出贡献被瑞典皇家科学院授予2016年度诺贝尔经济学奖。契约理论旨在研究如何通过契约安排使得面临不同利益冲突的人们更好地进行合作的问题。本文在简要回顾两位契约理论大师的学术生涯及其主要论著的基础上,阐述霍姆斯特罗姆的完全契约理论、哈特的不完全契约理论框架及其对契约理论发展的贡献,着重探讨契约理论如何通过契约安排解决合作过程中的冲突问题,最后通过契约理论在日常生活的具体应用、经济转型过程中国有企业改革方案设计等问题展示契约理论的价值,以及契约理论对国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的借鉴和参考价值。

Holmström and Hart were awarded the 2016 Nobel Economics Prize for their outstanding contributions to contract theory by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. Contract theory aims at promoting cooperation among people with interest conflicts through the design of contracts. This paper first gives a brief account of academic lives and main works of the two masters of contract theory, then elaborates complete contract theory of Holmström, incomplete contract theory of Hart and their main contributions to contract theory, places emphasis on the solution to the conflicts in the process of cooperation through contract arrangement by contract theory, and finally demonstrates the value of contract theory by issues like concrete application of contract theory to daily life and the design of the state-owned enterprises reform plan, and the implication of contract theory for state governance system and the modernization of governance capability.

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