大股东持股与公司诉讼风险--基于中国上市公司的实证分析

Shareholding of Large Blockholders and Firm Litigation Risks: An Empirical Study Based on Chinese Listed Companies

赵康生,周萍,蔺楠

2017 第 39 卷 第 01 期 页码 84-95

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2017.01.007

PDF全文下载 HTML全文

摘要

公司诉讼是影响企业正常经营的非常规事件,不仅可能造成财务损失,还可能影响企业声誉,导致客户流失以及后续融资等诸多问题,因此对公司诉讼风险影响因素的研究有重要意义。基于公司治理文献,本文以2007-2014年中国A股上市公司为初始研究样本,运用倾向得分匹配方法(PSM)分析了大股东持股对公司诉讼风险的影响。研究发现:(1)随着第一大股东持股比例的提高,公司诉讼风险显著降低。(2)随着公司可见性程度的提高,大股东降低公司诉讼风险的作用减弱。也就是说,相较于公司可见性高的企业,大股东在公司可见性低的企业中降低公司诉讼风险的作用更强。(3)相对于股权制衡公司,非股权制衡公司的大股东持股比例降低公司诉讼风险的效应更强。本文不仅深化了公司诉讼风险影响因素研究,而且有助于进一步拓展大股东在公司治理以及风险控制中的作用,对于理解大股东在防范公司诉讼风险方面的作用具有重要意义。

Firms' engagement in litigation is an unusual incident which might incur not only serious financial losses but also several problems such as damage of firm reputation, losses of customers and the difficulty in future financing. Therefore, the research of the factors influencing firm litigation risks has great significance. Based on the literature of corporate governance, this paper takes the A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014 as the initial sample, and employs propensity score matching method to analyze the effect of the shareholding of large blockholders on firm litigation risks. It comes to the conclusions as follows:firstly, with the increase in the shareholding proportion of the first largest blockholder, firm litigation risks significantly reduce; secondly, with the rise in firm visibility, the role of large blockholders in the reduction in firm litigation risks weakens, that is to say, compared with firms with higher visibility, the role of large blockholders in the reduction in firm litigation risks is stronger in firms with lower visibility; thirdly, compared with companies with blockholder counterbalance, the role of large blockholders in the reduction in firm litigation risks is stronger in companies without blockholder counterbalance. It not only deepens the research of the factors influencing firm litigation risks, but also further extends the role of large blockholders in corporate governance and risk control; and it is of great significance to the understanding of the role of large blockholders in the prevention of firm litigation risks.

参考文献

1 Atanasov V, Ivanov V, Litvak K. Does reputation limit opportunistic behavior in the VC industry? Evidence from litigation against VCs[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2012, 67(6):2215-2246. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01785.x
2 Autore D M, Hutton I, Peterson D R, et al. The effect of securities litigation on external financing[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2014, 27:231-250. DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.05.007
3 Bethel J E, Liebeskind J P, Opler T. Block share purchases and corporate performance[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1998, 53(2):605-634. DOI:10.1111/0022-1082.244195
4 Bushee B J, Miller G S. Investor relations, firm visibility, and investor following[J]. The Accounting Review, 2012, 87(3):867-897. DOI:10.2308/accr-10211
5 Cumming D, Leung T Y, Rui O. Gender diversity and securities fraud[J]. Academy of management Journal, 2015, 58(5):1572-1593. DOI:10.5465/amj.2013.0750
6 Holderness C G, Sheehan D P. The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations:An exploratory analysis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20:317-346. DOI:10.1016/0304-405X(88)90049-9
7 Jensen M C, Meckling W H. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3(4):305-360. DOI:10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
8 Koh P S, Qian C L, Wang H L. Firm litigation risk and the insurance value of corporate social performance[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2014, 35(10):1464-1482. DOI:10.1002/smj.2171
9 Lian Y J, Su Z, Gu Y D. Evaluating the effects of equity incentives using PSM:Evidence from China[J]. Frontiers of Business Research in China, 2011, 5(2):266-290. DOI:10.1007/s11782-011-0131-6
10 La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F, Shleifer A. Corporate ownership around the world[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1999, 54(2):471-517. DOI:10.1111/0022-1082.00115
11 La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F, Shleifer A, et al. Investor protection and corporate valuation[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2002, 57(3):1147-1170. DOI:10.1111/1540-6261.00457
13 Shen W, Zhou Q, Lau C M. Empirical research on corporate governance in China:A review and new directions for the future[J]. Management and Organization Review, 2016, 12(1):41-73. DOI:10.1017/mor.2015.11
14 Tan D. Making the news:Heterogeneous media coverage and corporate litigation[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2016, 37(7):1341-1353. DOI:10.1002/smj.2016.37.issue-7
15 Wang H L, Qian C L. Corporate philanthropy and corporate financial performance:The roles of stakeholder response and political access[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2011, 54(6):1159-1181. DOI:10.5465/amj.2009.0548