社会情感财富、制度压力与家族管理控制——基于香港上市家族公司的多案例研究

Socioemotional Wealth,Institutional Pressure and Family Management Control: A Multi-case Study Based on Hong Kong Listed Family Businesses

刘舒颖,孙嘉宝,朱沆

2016 第 38 卷 第 07 期 页码 3-23

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2016.07.001

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摘要

社会情感财富的观点认为,管理控制既是社会情感财富的目标,也是保存社会情感财富的手段,而新制度理论的观点则强调外部的制度压力会约束家族对公司管理的控制。家族控制的上市公司如何应对内部要求与外部压力的冲突?本文选取香港资本市场上的国美、创维、雅居乐和新鸿基四个家族上市公司作为研究对象,观察控制家族对六个家族管理负面事件的反应,发现事件确实会导致控制家族承受的制度压力增加,而家族根据制度压力的强弱,通过内部切割、象征性管理和实质性退让等方式加以应对,同时却保持或加强了对公司的股权控制。由此本文得出结论:为了回应外部的制度压力,维护家族对公司的根本性控制,家族往往借助调整管理控制来缓解保存社会情感财富与外部制度压力之间的冲突。上述发现既解决了两种理论观点在家族控制问题上的冲突,揭示了家族控制两个层面的不同作用,也拓展了新制度主义理论对制度压力变化的理论分析。

The socioemotional wealth view argues that management control is regarded as the objective and means for retaining a family's socioemotional wealth(SEW). However, neoinstitutional theory emphasizes that external institutional pressure would restrict families' management control on the firms. How do listed family businesses respond to the conflicts between internal needs and external pressure? This paper chooses four family businesses listed on Hong Kong stock market, namely Gome, Skyworth, Agile Property and Sun Hung Kai Properties, as our subjects, to observe the response of controlling families to six negatively exposed affairs related to family managment. It finds that affairs surely increase the institutional pressure that the controlling families bear, and the families respond to these affairs through internal excision, symbolic management and substantial concessions, based on the strength of institutional pressure, which help them to remain or strengthen the equity control over the businesses simultaneously. Hence it can conclude that in response to external institutional pressure, families always adjust their management control for buffering the conflict between keeping socioemotional wealth and external institutional pressure, to maintain fundamental family control on firms. The findings abovementioned not only solve the conflicts between these two theories as for family control and reveal the different role of family control at two levels, but also extend theoretical analysis of changes in institutional pressure by neo-institutional theory.

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