机构投资者特征、终极控制人性质与大股东掏空-基于关联交易视角的研究

Heterogeneity of Institutional Investors, Features of Ultimate Controllers and Large Shareholders' Tunneling: Based on the Related-party Transactions

吴先聪,张健,胡志颖

2016 第 38 卷 第 06 期 页码 3-20

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2016.06.001

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摘要

大股东与小股东之间的利益冲突是随着现代企业的发展而产生并不断演化的。大股东利用控制权编织的关联网络进行非公平交易成为侵占中小股东利益的主要手段,也成为各界关注的焦点。本文从不同特征的机构投资者入手,研究了独立与非独立机构投资者、长期与短期机构投资者对大股东关联交易掏空行为的抑制作用,进而讨论了在终极控制人不同的国有企业和家族企业中机构投资者的作用是否不同。实证结果表明,只有与公司没有业务联系、受政府干预少的独立机构投资者和持股时间较长的机构投资者才能有效限制关联交易中大股东的掏空行为。而且,在体制内的国有企业中,机构投资者能有效减少大股东关联交易中的利益侵占,但是,在以血缘和亲缘等纽带关系维系的家族企业中,机构投资者却不能减少关联股东的掏空行为。本文突破了机构投资者的同质性假设,揭示了组织的体制属性会影响机构投资者作用的发挥,检验了在特定情境下政府治理与公司治理作用的相互关系。

The conflicts of interests between large and small shareholders emerge and constantly involve along with the development of modern enterprises. And unfair transactions by big stockholders through interconnected networks knitted based on control rights become an important means of the expropriation of minority shareholders & also are the social focus. From a perspective of different characteristics of institutional investors, this paper studies the prohibition role of independent & dependent institutional investors and long-term & short-term institutional investors in block shareholders' tunneling in related-party transactions, and then discusses the role of institutional investors in state-owned and family enterprises under differentiated ultimate controllers. Empirical study shows that only dependent institutional investors that have no business contacts with companies and less government intervention and institutional investors with longer stockholding duration play an effective role in the inhibition of block shareholders' tunneling in related-party transactions. Furthermore, in state-owned enterprises, institutional investors can effectively reduce the expropriation of minority shareholders in related-party transactions by big stockholders, but in family enterprises maintained by the relationships like blood and kinship, institutional investors cannot decrease related stockholders' tunneling. This paper breaches the homogeneity hypotheses of institutional investors, reveals the effect of organizational system attribute on the exertion of the role of institutional investors, and tests the interrelation between government governance and corporate governance in special context.

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