地理距离对政府引导基金绩效的影响——基于政经互动的视角

The Impact of Geographical Distance on the Performance of Government-guided Funds: From the Perspective of Political-Economic Interaction

杨晔,左佳弘

2025 第 47 卷 第 10 期 页码 134-152

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20241014.401

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摘要

提高政府引导基金的运作效率是各地政府关注的重点,在“政府+市场化”运作模式中,子基金管理机构发挥的作用不容忽视。地理距离作为重要的外生因素将影响子基金管理机构的投资行为,进一步影响引导基金的运作效率。本文采用2008—2019年成立的政府引导基金子基金作为研究样本进行回归发现,子基金管理机构与政府引导基金较远的地理距离将提高子基金的经济绩效,但也将降低其战略目标的实现程度。这一现象主要系因较远的地理距离减弱了政府的监督管理,提高了子基金管理机构获得的授权,使其更为自主地进行市场化投资决策,投资高利润项目而非政府引导基金标的。上述现象在管理机构能力较差,地区风险投资活跃度较低,投资速度较慢的子基金中更为明显。进一步分析发现,目前我国政府引导基金投资及子基金管理机构选择具有明显的本地偏好,在一定程度上保障了战略目标的实现,具有较高的逻辑理性。本文研究为正确认识和提高政府引导基金的运作效率提供了新的证据和政策建议。

In recent years, the scale of China’s government-guided funds has expanded rapidly, but their operational efficiency is still uneven. Existing research has mainly focused on market-level influencing factors, but has not yet paid attention to the impact of the internal management and authorization relationship within government-guided funds. From the perspective of political-economic interaction, this paper explores the impact and path of geographical distance on the performance of government-guided funds. Taking the sub-funds of government-guided funds established in 2008-2019 as the research sample, this paper finds that geographical distance will improve the economic performance of sub-funds, but also reduce the achievement degree of its strategic targets. This is mainly due to the fact that geographical distance weakens the government’s supervision and increases the authorization obtained by sub-fund management institutions, so they can make more market-oriented investment decisions and invest in high-profit projects rather than the subjects of government-guided funds. In addition, China’s government-guided funds and sub-fund management institutions have obvious local preferences, which is positive to their strategic goals. This paper has the following contributions: First, it confirms the political-economic interaction between the government and sub-fund management institutions, and also provides a new perspective for analyzing government-guided funds. Second, it measures the performance of government-guided funds more comprehensively, and conducts a dual quantitative analysis of investment returns and strategic targets. Third, it enriches the understanding of the fluctuation and heterogeneity of the internal authorization of government-guided funds, confirms the path of “geographical distance – sub-fund management institution authorization – investment behavior – fund performance”, and provides suggestions for improving government venture capital efficiency.

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