双重目标期望逆差与公司创业投资行为——基于组织结构的视角

Negative Attainment Discrepancy on Dual Goals and Corporate Venture Capital: From the Perspective of Organizational Structure

谢韵典,董静,李辰

2025 第 47 卷 第 01 期 页码 70-87

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20231031.101

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摘要

投资“赛道”的选择是公司创业投资活动首先要考虑的问题,并且对企业的战略收益具有重要影响。本文基于企业行为理论,检验财务、创新双重目标期望逆差对公司创业投资行业选择的影响,并将投资单元的结构特征,即自主权纳入理论框架中,进一步探讨投资单元组织结构对上述关系所起的调节作用。通过对2008—2018年间我国沪深股市上市公司所控制的投资单元的实证分析,得到以下结论:随着财务和创新期望逆差的增加,投资单元跨行业投资倾向也会升高。投资单元自主权提高了投资单元对财务绩效反馈的注意力,从而增强了财务期望逆差与跨行业投资之间的正向关系。同时,投资单元自主权强化了投资经理对财务目标相对于创新目标具有更高优先级的认识,因此在财务绩效出现下滑时,相较于低自主权的投资单元,高自主权的投资单元对创新目标的响应程度更弱。本文同时考虑财务和创新双重目标,拓展了企业行为理论,对公司创业投资的组织结构设计也具有启示意义。

The choice of industry is a primary consideration in corporate venture capital activities, exerting a significant influence on corporate strategic outcomes. Based on the behavioral theory of the firm, this paper examines the impact of negative attainment discrepancy on dual goals—financial and innovative—on the industry selection of corporate venture capital. Furthermore, it incorporates the structural characteristic of investment units, specifically autonomy, into the theoretical framework to delve into its moderating effect. This paper draws the following conclusions from an empirical analysis of investment units controlled by companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in China from 2008 to 2018. First, investment units tend to respond to an increase in the negative attainment discrepancy on both financial and innovative goals by increasing cross-industry investments. Second, investment unit autonomy increases their focus on financial performance feedback, reinforcing the positive relationship between negative attainment discrepancy and cross-industry investments. Third, investment unit autonomy reinforces investment managers’ recognition of the higher priority of financial goals over innovative goals. Consequently, when faced with a decline in financial performance, investment units with greater autonomy are more likely to attenuate their response to innovative goals in comparison to those with weaker autonomy. This paper considers both financial and negative goals, extending the behavioral theory of the firm and offering valuable insights for the design of organizational structures in the field of corporate venture capital.

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