“多言寡行”的数字化转型披露能否被投资者识别?——基于股票错误定价的证据

Can Investors Recognize the Digital Transformation Disclosure of “Talk More, Do Less”? Evidence from Stock Mispricing

黄哲,杜斐烨,金洪飞,王晶

2025 第 47 卷 第 08 期 页码 19-35

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20241115.101

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摘要

企业数字化转型低实际投入下的高文本披露是否蕴含了预期泡沫?超过企业数字化实际投入水平的文本信息披露如何影响投资者的投资决策?本文利用2006—2021年A股企业数据,探讨了“多言寡行”的数字化转型披露对股票错误定价的影响。研究发现,“多言寡行”的数字化转型披露体现了企业的市值操纵动机。这种披露策略在短期内难以被投资者识别,加剧了投资者对企业股票的错误定价,使股价向上偏离基本面价值。机制检验表明,“多言寡行”的数字化转型披露策略会使投资者情绪高涨,进而导致错误定价。进一步研究发现,数字化转型披露“多言寡行”导致错误定价的现象可能出现在多个细分科技领域,而高质量审计、独立董事履职和良好的公司内部治理能够抑制数字化转型“多言寡行”下的股票错误定价。本文可以为探究企业数字化转型信息披露背后的金融风险及其治理提供借鉴。

Does the “high text disclosure” under the “low actual investment” of corporate digital transformation imply a bubble? How does textual information disclosure that exceeds the actual level of investment in digital transformation affect investors’ investment decisions? This paper uses data from A-share companies from 2006 to 2021 to explore the impact of the digital transformation disclosure of “talk more, do less” on stock mispricing. The findings show that such disclosure reflects the motives of companies to manipulate their market value. This kind of disclosure strategy is difficult for investors to identify in the short term, increasing stock mispricing and causing stock prices to deviate upwards from their fundamental values. Mechanism testing suggests that the disclosure strategy inflates investor sentiment, leading to stock mispricing. Further research reveals that: First, the phenomenon of “talk more, do less” in digital transformation disclosure may lead to stock mispricing across various segmented fields of digital technology. Second, high-quality audits, performance of independent directors, and good internal governance can suppress stock mispricing under the digital transformation disclosure of “talk more, do less”. This paper offers insights into the financial risks underlying corporate digital transformation disclosure and the governance of such risks.

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