制度影响繁荣的因果评估与制度变迁的动态博弈分析——2024年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主主要经济理论贡献述评

Causality of Institutions on Prosperity and Dynamic Game Analysis of Institutional Change: A Review of Main Contributions by 2024 Nobel Economics Laureates

李宝良,郭其友,郑文智

2024 第 46 卷 第 11 期 页码 138-152

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20241108.101

PDF全文下载 HTML全文

摘要

达伦·阿西莫格鲁、西蒙·约翰逊和詹姆斯·A·罗宾逊三位经济学家因对“制度如何形成和影响繁荣的研究”荣获2024年度诺贝尔经济学奖。他们通过实证设计和理论建模方法,将制度决定论的研究推向新阶段。一方面,他们利用殖民地的历史自然实验,选取殖民定居者死亡率作为工具变量对实证研究进行准实验设计,解决制度影响繁荣因果评估中的制度内生性难题,并通过对现代世界财富逆转现象的分析,揭示了制度对繁荣的因果性影响;另一方面,他们构建动态博弈理论框架推进制度变迁的政治经济学分析,突显承诺在解决社会冲突的制度变迁过程中的关键作用,对国家兴衰和纷繁复杂的制度变迁现象做出不同的阐释。他们的研究深化了人们对制度及其在经济发展中作用的理解。当然,他们的研究也存在诸多局限。虽然他们回应了实证研究中对工具变量排他性假设和数据可靠性的质疑,但其工具变量的排他性假设依然存有争议;另外,他们对制度变迁研究潜在地假设制度之间存在单向层级结构,对制度体系之间的耦合缺乏考虑;等等。虽然他们在给定地理、文化等其他因素不变的情况下证明了制度的影响,但是这并不能说明其他因素对经济发展没有影响。因此,政策制定者在援引他们的研究时,必须避免以单一的制度因素解释复杂经济系统的所有现象的误区。

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson are awarded the 2024 Nobel Prize in Economics “for studies of how institutions are formed and affect prosperity”. They pushed the study of institutional determinism to a new stage through innovative empirical design and theoretical modeling, and improved the comprehensive understanding of the role of institutions together with the micro research of new institutional economics. On the one hand, they creatively conducted quasi-experimental design to identify the causal link of how institutions affect prosperity from macro and historical perspectives using natural experiments in colonial history. Their empirical studies promoted the development of the credibility revolution of empirical economics in the field of quantitative history. On the other hand, by constructing a dynamic game model for political economic analysis of institutional change, they highlighted the crucial role of commitment in resolving social conflicts in the process of institutional change. They extend North’s theory of the State, providing an explanation for the rise and fall of states different from Olson’s analysis based on interest groups, and offering an interpretation of rich phenomena such as institutional evolution, recurrence, and even stagnation. However, their contributions are not flawless. Firstly, there is still controversy over whether the selection of instrumental variables in empirical research on the causality of institutions on prosperity satisfies the assumption of exogeneity. European colonizers brought not only institutions but also human capital to their colonies, making it difficult to distinguish the impact of institutions and human capital on economic growth. Secondly, in the study of institutional change, the potential assumption that there is a hierarchical structure between institutions also needs to be discussed. Society is a complex system, and there is a coupling structure between various institutions, making it difficult to achieve optimal results if institutional change is leading or lagging behind. Finally, their empirical research identified the causal link of institutions on economic growth given factors such as geography and culture constant. This does not mean that other factors such as geography or culture have no effect on economic growth, and policymakers should avoid using a single factor to explain economic development. Their research, especially the insights on inclusive systems, has important reference value for China’s economic system reform. China should deepen institutional reform and build a unified national market, promote effective allocation of resources nationwide through more inclusive systems, and improve resource allocation efficiency to achieve economic growth

.

参考文献

1 达龙·阿西莫格鲁, 西蒙·约翰逊, 詹姆斯·罗宾逊. 贫富的逆转——现代世界贫富格局中地理和制度的作用[A]. 比较(吴敬琏主编)第32辑[C]. 北京: 中信出版社, 2007.
2 达龙·阿西莫格鲁. 为什么政治科斯定理不成立: 社会冲突、承诺以及政治学[A]. 比较(吴敬琏主编). 第84辑[C]. 中信出版社, 2016.
3 戴维·S.兰德斯著, 门洪华译. 国富国穷[M]. 北京: 新华出版社, 2010.
4 道格拉斯·诺思著, 杭行译, 制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M]. 上海: 格致出版社、上海三联书店、上海人民出版社, 2012.
5 道格拉斯·诺斯, 罗伯斯·托马斯著, 厉以平、蔡磊译, 西方世界的兴起[M]. 北京: 华夏出版社, 2017.
6 德隆·阿西莫格鲁, 詹姆斯·罗宾逊. 李增刚译, 国家为什么会失败[M], 长沙: 湖南科学技术出版社, 2015.
7 贾雷德·戴蒙德著, 王道还、廖月娟译. 枪炮、病菌与钢铁[M]. 北京: 中信出版集团, 2022.
9 林毅夫. 关于制度变迁的经济学理论: 诱致性变迁与强制性变迁[A]. 见: 科斯等. 财产权利与制度变迁[C]. 上海: 上海三联书店, 1994.
10 陆铭. 观念与中国经济转型——以区域发展的空间政治经济学为例[J]. 学术月刊, 2024, 56(05): 32-43.
11 陆铭著, 大国大城: 当代中国的统一、发展与平衡[M]. 上海: 上海人民出版社, 2016.
12 李增刚. 包容性制度与长期经济增长——阿西莫格鲁和罗宾逊的国家兴衰理论评析[J]. 经济社会体制比较, 2013, (01): 21-30.
13 马克斯·韦伯. 新教伦理与资本主义精神[M]. 北京: 北京大学出版社, 2017.
14 曼瑟·奥尔森著, 李增刚译. 国家兴衰: 经济增长、滞胀和社会僵化[M]. 上海: 上海世纪出版集团, 2005.
15 许小年. 制度体系的内在一致性: 现代化转型的一个分析框架[R]. 见: 许小年. 回荡的钟摆[M]. 北京: 计划经济出版社, 2017.
16 Acemoglu, D. Modeling inefficient institutions[A]. in R. Blundell, W. K. Newey, and T. Persson (eds. ), Advances in economics and econometrics theory and applications[C]. Ninth World Congress, 2006: 341–380.
17 Acemoglu, D. , F. A. Gallego, J. A. Robinson. Institutions, human capital, and development[j]. Annual Review of Economics, 2014, 6: 875–912.
18 Acemoglu, D. , S. Johnson, J. A. Robinson. The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation[J]. American Economic Review, 2001, 91: 1369-1401. DOI:10.1257/aer.91.5.1369
19 Acemoglu, D. , S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson. Institutions as fundamental causes of long-run growth[A]. in Aghion, P. and S. Durlauf (eds. ), Handbook of economic growth[C] , Vol. 1A, Amsterdam, NL: Elsevier, North-Holland, 2005.
20 Acemoglu, D. , S. Johnson, J. A. Robinson. The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation: Reply[J], American Economic Review, 2012, 102: 895–946.
21 Acemoglu, D. , S. Naidu, P. Restrepo, J. A. Robinson. Democracy does cause growth[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2019, 127(1): 47-100. DOI:10.1086/700936
22 Acemoglu, D. , J. A. Robinson. Why did the west extend the franchise?Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective[J]. Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 2000a, 115: 1167-1199. DOI:10.1162/003355300555042
23 Acemoglu, D. , J. A. Robinson. Political losers as a barrier to economic development[J]. American Economic Review, 2000b, 90: 126-130. DOI:10.1257/aer.90.2.126
24 Acemoglu, D. , J. A. Robinson. A theory of political transitions[J]. American Economic Review, 2001, 91: 938-963. DOI:10.1257/aer.91.4.938
25 Acemoglu, D. , J. A. Robinson, Economic backwardness in political perspective[J]. American Political Science Review, 2006, 100: 115-131. DOI:10.1017/S0003055406062046
26 Acemoglu, D. , J. A. Robinson. Persistence of power, elites, and institutions[J]. American Economic Review, 2008, 98: 267-293. DOI:10.1257/aer.98.1.267
27 Acemoglu, D. , J. A. Robinson. Weak, despotic, or inclusive? How state type emerges from state versus civil society competition[J]. American Political Science Review, 2023, 117(2): 407-420. DOI:10.1017/S0003055422000740
28 Albouy, D. The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation: Comment[J]. American Economic Review, 2012, 102: 3059-3076. DOI:10.1257/aer.102.6.3059
29 Dell, M. The persistent effects of Peru’s mining mita[J]. Econometrica, 2010, 78: 1863-1903. DOI:10.3982/ECTA8121
30 Fujita M. , P. Krugman. The new economic geography: Past, present and the future[J]. Papers in Regional Science, 2004, 83(1): 139-164. DOI:10.1007/s10110-003-0180-0
31 Góes C. , E. Bekkers. The impact of geopolitical conflicts on trade, growth, and innovation[J]. WTO working papers, 2022. DOI: https://doi.org/10.30875/25189808-2022-9.
32 Glaeser, E. , R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer. Do institutions cause growth?[J]. Journal of Economic Growth, 2004, 9: 271-303. DOI:10.1023/B:JOEG.0000038933.16398.ed
33 Guiso L. , P. Sapienza, L. Zingales. Does culture affect economic outcomes?[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2006, 20(2): 23-48. DOI:10.1257/jep.20.2.23
34 Hall, R. E. , Jones, C. Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others? [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114(1): 83-116.
35 Mauro, P. Corruption and growth[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995, 110(3): 681-712. DOI:10.2307/2946696
36 Nunn, N. The long-term effects of Africa’s slave trades[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008, 123: 139-176. DOI:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.139
37 Persson, T. , G. Tabellini. Democratic capital: The nexus of political and economic change[J]. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2009, 1: 88-126. DOI:10.1257/mac.1.2.88
38 Powell, R. Power sharing with weak institutions[J]. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2024, 36: 186-211. DOI:10.1177/09516298241232655