公司违规是否影响地区声誉?——基于地区内上市公司市场反应的研究

Do Corporate Violations Affect Regional Reputation? Based on the Market Reaction in the Same Region

何雁,孟庆玺,常语萱

2023 第 45 卷 第 11 期 页码 79-96

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20221228.203

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摘要

地缘是理解我国企业行为的重要因素,当投资者缺少公司特质信息时,同地区其他公司的信息会被用于预测该公司行为,产生信息溢出效应。信息溢出为投资者提供了增量信息,有助于判断公司真实价值,但也可能导致错误定价。本文以2001—2018年证监会立案调查的上市公司及其同地区(城市)其他上市公司为样本,发现当地区首次发生上市公司重大违规被证监会立案调查的事件后,不仅违规公司股价显著下跌,同地区其他上市公司的股票收益表现也显著变差。进一步检验发现,地区制度环境越差或公司信息环境越差,违规信息的地区溢出效应越强。然而,没有证据表明受到负面影响的公司在未来更可能违规。同时,受影响公司会组织更多的投资者调研来加强与投资者的沟通。公司违规行为会损害地区声誉,而加强地区制度建设和增强公司信息披露能够缓解对当地经济活动的负外部性影响。

Geographical relationship is an important factor in understanding the behavior of Chinese enterprises. Due to the important role of the government in resource allocation and the widespread existence of social relations in transactions, enterprises’ economic activities are highly embedded in the local market, and most stakeholders come from the local market, which makes the behavior characteristics of enterprises in the same region highly similar. Then, how do investors view this similarity, and will they use this regional information to value the stocks in the region? When investors lack the specific information of the enterprise, the information of other enterprises in the same region will be used to predict the enterprise’s behavior, leading to the information spillover effect. Information spillover provides investors with incremental information, which helps them judge the true value of other enterprises but may also lead to wrong pricing.

This paper uses major violations in the capital market to measure the use of regional information by investors with the market reaction it brings. Specifically, this paper takes the first exposure of the major violations of listed companies in various regions (cities) of China from 2001 to 2018 as an entry point. It is found that when a listed company’s violations are investigated by the CSRC for the first time in a certain region, not only the market reaction of the company being investigated for major violations is significantly negative, but also the stock return of other companies in the same region is significantly reduced. Moreover, the stock prices of the affected companies do not rebound for a long time after the event. However, there is no evidence that these companies will be more likely to violate the rules in the future.

Further evidence shows that the local institutional environment and the corporate information environment affect the regional spillover effect of corporate violations. The more imperfect the local institutional environment (lower marketization, lower social trust) or the worse the corporate information environment (higher supply chain concentration, non-Big4, less analyst following), the more serious the negative impact of the spillover effect. At the same time, the affected companies will also take active responses and organize more investor visits to minimize the additional costs caused by the spillover effect.

The enlightenment is that: First, improving the institutional environment helps to promote the sound development of enterprises and maintain the stability of local economy. Second, enterprises should be encouraged to adopt diversified information communication methods to improve enterprise information transparency. Third, the construction of a unified national market and the free flow of factor resources should be accelerated to improve the resource allocation efficiency in the capital market.

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