管理层薪酬激励行业参照对企业ESG表现的影响效应
The Impact of Industry-referenced Executive Compensation Incentives on Corporate ESG Performance
DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20260429.101
[1]田凌宇,谢承轩,程新生.管理层薪酬激励行业参照对企业ESG表现的影响效应[J/OL].外国经济与管理,2026,48(06):78-95[2026-11-20].https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20260429.101.
摘要
随着可持续发展理念深入人心,企业ESG表现已成为衡量企业可持续发展能力的重要指标。基于2011—2022年沪深A股公司数据,以企业行为理论(BTOF)和行为代理模型(BAM)为指导,实证检验了管理层薪酬激励行业参照对企业ESG表现的影响,研究发现:高于外部参照点的管理层薪酬激励能够显著促进企业ESG表现的提升;机制检验表明,管理层薪酬激励行业参照提高了分析师和媒体的关注度,并引起管理层对环境和社会责任的关注,可以提升企业ESG表现;异质性分析发现,重污染行业、受到环境规制约束以及管理层存在环保背景的企业,薪酬激励行业参照对ESG表现的正向影响更强;进一步分析发现,薪酬激励高于外部参照点的企业并未出现ESG脱耦的现象。本文从企业ESG表现和ESG脱耦方面揭示了管理层激励产生的效应,并基于外部关注和管理层关注探究影响机制,为优化企业激励方案提供了经验证据。
As the principles of sustainable development become increasingly embedded in corporate practice, a firm’s environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance has emerged as a pivotal metric for assessing its long-term sustainability and resilience. Drawing upon the behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) and the behavioral agency model (BAM), this paper uses data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to 2022 to empirically investigate the impact of industry-referenced executive compensation incentives on corporate ESG performance. The results show that executive compensation incentives exceeding the external reference point exerts a significant positive impact on corporate ESG performance. Mechanism testing reveals that such industry-referenced executive compensation incentives elevate the attention from both financial analysts and the media, while simultaneously directing managerial attention toward environmental and social responsibilities, thereby facilitating improvements in corporate ESG performance. Heterogeneity analysis indicates that this positive effect is more pronounced among firms in heavily-polluting industries, those subject to stringent environmental regulations, and those with environmental protection background in management. Further analysis confirms that firms whose compensation incentives exceed the external reference point do not experience ESG decoupling. This paper reveals the effects of executive compensation incentives from corporate ESG performance and ESG decoupling, and explores the underlying mechanism based on external and managerial attention, providing empirical evidence for optimizing corporate incentive structures.
关键词: ESG表现,管理层薪酬激励,参照点效应,ESG脱耦