产权权利束分割与国有企业ESG表现——基于中央企业分红权激励试点的准自然实验
Partitioning of Property Rights and ESG Performance of State-owned Enterprises: A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Bonus Incentive Reform of Central State-owned Enterprises
DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20250401.203
[1]马新啸,殷正香,黄晓珊,管戴煜.产权权利束分割与国有企业ESG表现——基于中央企业分红权激励试点的准自然实验[J/OL].外国经济与管理,2025,47(07):20-36[2026-11-20].https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20250401.203.
摘要
良好的ESG表现对激发微观主体动能和实现宏观经济可持续发展至关重要,有效提升国有企业的ESG表现构成新时代推动国有企业高质量发展的应有之义。以中央企业分红权激励改革为准自然实验,本文研究产权权利束分割对国有企业ESG表现的影响作用。研究发现:基于分红权激励改革的收益权分割安排有助于提高国有企业的ESG表现,该结论在经过一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。机制检验发现,产权权利束分割对内可以提高国企雇员价值创造水平,对外能够增强公众对国企的绿色关注度,从而强化国企改善ESG表现的动机与能力。异质性分析发现,上述积极影响在人才培养水平较高、劳动者权益保护较好、碳排放和空气污染程度较高的地区,以及雇员薪资待遇较差、竞争激烈行业和高科技行业的企业当中更为明显。本文不仅对产权权利束分割经济后果的学术研究作出有益拓展,而且为党和国家做强做优做大国有企业提供重要实践参考。
Excellent ESG performance is crucial for stimulating the vitality of micro entities and achieving sustainable macroeconomic development. Effectively improving the ESG performance of state-owned enterprises constitutes the necessary meaning of promoting the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises in the new era. Based on the quasi-natural experiment of the bonus incentive reform of central state-owned enterprises (No. 148), this paper systematically examines the impact of partitioning of property rights on the ESG performance of state-owned enterprises. The results show that partitioning of property rights based on the bonus incentive reform is helpful in improving the ESG performance of state-owned enterprises, and this conclusion remains valid after a series of robustness tests. Mechanism testing indicates that partitioning of property rights can increase the value creation level of state-owned enterprises’ employees internally and enhance the public’s green attention to state-owned enterprises externally, thereby strengthening the motivation and capability of state-owned enterprises to improve their ESG performance. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the above positive effects are more pronounced in regions with a higher level of talent cultivation, better protection of labor rights, and a higher level of carbon emissions and air pollution, as well as in state-owned enterprises with lower employee salary and welfare, highly competitive industries, and high-tech industries. This paper not only expands the academic research on the economic consequences of partitioning of property rights, but also provides a significant practical reference for the Party and the state to strengthen, optimize, and expand state-owned enterprises.
关键词: 产权权利束分割,分红权激励,中央企业,企业ESG表现,可持续发展