通道业务监管与审计定价——来自《资管新规》的证据

Conduit Business Regulation and Audit Pricing: Evidence from the New Rules on Assets Management

曾嶒,何思怡

2025 第 47 卷 第 09 期 页码 137-152

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20250409.201

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摘要

企业借助复杂的通道业务融资掩盖真实负债水平,不仅降低了会计信息质量,还会导致实体经济的杠杆率被严重低估,从而成为影响微观企业与宏观经济稳定发展的潜藏危机。利用《资管新规》“去通道”的外生冲击,本文研究了通道业务监管对审计定价的影响。研究发现,《资管新规》发布后,原先使用通道融资的企业支付的审计费用显著降低。异质性分析表明,当企业更倾向于隐藏负债和规避监管以及审计师的专业能力较弱时,加强通道业务监管降低审计费用的作用越大。路径分析显示,加强通道业务监管通过降低审计风险和审计成本导致审计费用下降。本文揭示了金融监管在提升微观企业会计信息质量方面的积极作用,为监管机构、审计师及企业决策提供了重要参考。

Enterprises use complex conduit business financing to conceal their actual liability levels, which not only reduces the quality of accounting information, but also leads to a serious underestimation of the leverage ratio of the real economy, thus becoming a potential crisis affecting the stable development of micro enterprises and macro economy. Using the exogenous shock of “de-conduit” in the New Rules on Assets Management (NRAM), this paper examines the impact of conduit business regulation on audit pricing. The results show that after the promulgation of the NRAM, the audit fees paid by enterprises that previously used conduit financing have significantly decreased. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that when enterprises are more inclined to conceal liabilities and evade regulation, and when auditors’ professional abilities are insufficient, conduit business regulation has a greater impact on audit fees. Mechanism testing reveals that conduit business regulation leads to a decline in audit fees by reducing audit risks and audit costs. This paper uncovers the positive role of financial regulation in improving the quality of accounting information, and has important implications and practical significance for regulatory agencies, auditors, and corporate decision-making.

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