论资排辈、隐性规范与公司违规行为:基于非正式制度视角的研究

Seniority, Implicit Norms, and Corporate Violations: A Study from the Perspective of Informal Institutions

林翠梁,徐细雄,吴林春

2025 第 47 卷 第 02 期 页码 53-68

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20240827.204

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摘要

论资排辈文化蕴含的身份隔离和等级差序等隐性规范可能阻碍信息流动、弱化公司内部监督,进而滋生公司违规行为。基于此,本文突破传统的制度与契约理论范式,重点从非正式制度视角考察论资排辈文化对公司违规行为的影响效应及机理。运用2008—2021年沪深A股上市公司数据,实证研究发现,论资排辈文化显著增加了公司违规概率及违规次数。进一步检验揭示,论资排辈文化主要通过削弱公司内部监督和降低信息质量这两条路径提高了公司违规行为。此外,在国有产权、高权力集中度、绩效压力较大以及男性董事长的企业中,论资排辈文化对公司违规行为的负面效果更明显。本研究从隐性规范视角深化了对公司违规行为赖以依存的文化土壤及其力量逻辑的理解,丰富了公司违规主题研究文献。它也对破除组织内身份壁垒、激发员工个体活力,以更好发挥员工群体的主体性治理价值具有一定实践启示。

The implicit norms of segregation and hierarchical order embedded in seniority culture may impede the flow of corporate information, weaken internal oversight, and thus breed corporate violations. Based on this, this paper breaks away from the traditional paradigm of institutional and contractual theory and focuses on the effect and mechanism of seniority culture on corporate violations from the perspective of informal institutions. Using the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2021, this paper empirically finds that seniority culture significantly increases the probability and frequency of company violations. Further testing reveals that seniority culture aggravates the propensity of firms to commit fraud mainly through two paths: weakening internal oversight and reducing information quality. It is also found that the negative effect of seniority culture on corporate violations are more pronounced in firms with state-owned ownership, higher power concentration, greater performance pressure, and male chairmen. This paper enriches the research on corporate violations by deepening the understanding of the cultural soil on which corporate violations depend and the logic of their power from the perspective of implicit norms. It also has important practical implications for breaking down identity barriers within organizations and stimulating the vitality of individual employees to better utilize the subjective governance value of employee groups.

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