“揭榜挂帅”制度能否提升企业创新绩效——基于多期双重差分方法的分析

Will the “Enlisting and Leading” System Improve Enterprise Innovation Performance? A Study Based on the Multi-period DID Method

杨兴全,龚泓西

2026 第 48 卷 第 02 期 页码 118-135

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20250916.401

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摘要

重塑国家创新体系是适应科技发展新态势,纵深推进创新驱动发展战略的关键举措。本文从科技体制改革视角出发,以2013—2023年中国沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,运用多期双重差分模型考察了“揭榜挂帅”制度对企业创新绩效的影响及其作用机理。本文研究发现,“揭榜挂帅”制度能够正向助推企业创新数量和质量提升。机制检验发现,“揭榜挂帅”制度通过创新资源集聚和创新潜能激发从而促进企业创新。进一步研究发现,在专利诉讼风险低、跨区域揭榜力度大、地区人才供给高及政府创新支持力度小的时候“揭榜挂帅”制度对企业创新的促进效应更为显著。此外,“揭榜挂帅”制度在促进企业创新的同时显著提升了企业核心竞争力与全要素生产率。本文的研究不仅丰富了“揭榜挂帅”制度的微观治理效应研究,也为政府部门从宏观调控视角激发企业创新活力,破解“卡脖子”技术难题提供了有益启示与经验借鉴。

From the perspective of scientific and technological system reform, this paper takes non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2013 to 2023 as the research sample, and uses a multi-period DID model to investigate the impact of the “Enlisting and Leading” system on enterprise innovation performance and its mechanism. The results show that the “Enlisting and Leading” system positively promotes the quantity and quality of enterprise innovation. Mechanism testing reveals that this positive effect is mainly achieved by gathering innovative resources and stimulating innovative potential. Further research finds that the effect is more pronounced when the risk of patent litigation is lower, the intensity of cross-regional enlistment is higher, the supply of local talents is greater, and the support of government innovation is weaker. In addition, the system significantly improves the core competitiveness and TFP of enterprises while promoting innovation. This paper not only enriches the study of the micro-governance effect of the “Enlisting and Leading” system, but also provides useful insights and empirical references for the government to stimulate enterprise innovation vitality from a macro-control perspective and address “bottleneck” technological challenges.

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