针对性环境规制有治理效能吗?——基于中央企业环保督察的实证分析

Does Targeted Environmental Regulation have Governance Effectiveness? An Empirical Analysis Based on Environmental Protection Inspections of Central State-owned Enterprises

毛新述,时晨晓,李美萱,毛聚

2025 第 47 卷 第 06 期 页码 120-134

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20241224.202

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摘要

作为环境治理领域的重大创新,中央环保督察制度已成为推动我国经济绿色发展的关键一环。已有研究主要从督察压力的间接传递视角(督察组—地方政府—微观企业)考察中央环保督察制度的影响,而对于督查组直接进驻微观企业的影响缺乏必要讨论。本文以2018—2022年A股央企上市公司为研究对象,对中央企业环保督察的治理效果进行分析。研究发现,央企上市公司在进驻公告日附近存在显著负向市场反应,尤其在高污染高能耗企业和未通过环境认证企业中更明显;中央企业环保督察通过促进企业加大环保投入力度的方式改善企业环境绩效,通过提高资源利用率的方式改善企业经济绩效,尤其在央企集团控制力较大、高管纵向兼任或属于“双百企业”的公司中效果更突出。本文为进一步推动现代环境治理体系构建和协调经济高质量发展与生态环境高水平保护提供理论支撑。

The Central Environmental Inspection System, a major innovation in environmental governance, has become a pivotal mechanism driving China’s green economic development. While existing research largely examines the indirect transmission of inspection pressure (i.e., from inspection teams to local governments and then to enterprises), there is limited discussion on the direct impact of inspection teams on individual enterprises. This paper focuses on the governance effect of Central Environmental Inspections on A-share listed central state-owned enterprises from 2018 to 2022. The findings reveal a significant negative market reaction around the inspection announcement dates, particularly in high-pollution and high-energy-consuming enterprises, and those without environmental certification. The inspections help improve environmental performance by encouraging greater investment in environmental protection and enhance economic performance by increasing resource efficiency. The effect is especially pronounced in enterprises with strong control by the parent group, those with executives holding multiple positions within the group, or those included in the “Double Hundred Enterprises” initiative. This paper provides valuable insights for advancing China’s environmental governance system and offers theoretical support for balancing high-quality economic development with ecological protection.

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