政府调研与债券发行利差

Official Visits and Bond Issuance Spreads

侯学明,朱亮,王少飞

2026 第 48 卷 第 03 期 页码 82-96

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20251212.201

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摘要

基于公司网站所公布的政府调研数据,本文对政府调研与企业债券利差的关系进行了实证检验。研究发现,政府调研作为一种非正式制度,会降低调研企业的债券发行利差,而企业性质和政商关系会产生替代效应,但企业的信息不对称程度则会产生放大效应,并且政府调研本身具有政策信号作用,政府调研具有地区的溢出效应。此外,政府调研级别、连续调研、外部政府调研等也会影响到政府调研与债券发行利差的关系。本文的研究揭示了非正式制度在债券市场中的作用机理,对理解现阶段我国调研工作的指挥棒作用,以及金融服务实体经济的开展成效都具有现实意义。

This paper studies the impact of official visits on bond issuance spreads based on the data of official visits from listed company websites. Official visits, as an informal institution, will reduce bond issuance spreads, and the relationship is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises, enterprises with no political connections, and enterprises with high information opacity. In addition, factors including the rank of official visits, continuous official visits, and non-local official visits will also affect this relationship. The study also finds a regional spillover effect of official visits. This paper reveals the mechanism of informal institutions in the bond market, which has practical significance for understanding the guiding role of current official visits in China and the effectiveness of financial services for the real economy.

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