财务舞弊、行业特征与公司投资“同伴效应”

Financial Fraud, Industry Characteristics and “Peer Effects” of Corporate Investment

王磊,胡纯华,孔东民

2018 第 40 卷 第 12 期 页码 125-137

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2018.12.009

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摘要

公司同伴效应是指公司个体行为受到参照组内其他公司行为或特征的影响,高管社会学习是导致公司同伴效应产生的重要原因,但这种学习行为是否理性还值得商榷。本文以2000—2015年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,基于行业特征的研究视角,考察行业领导者虚构利润对同伴公司投资决策的影响。结果表明,行业领导者虚构利润向外界传递行业虚假繁荣的错误信号,同伴公司为占据更高的市场份额而扩大投资规模;而且,同伴公司的反应程度受行业特征的影响,具体而言,行业竞争度加剧了同伴公司对行业领导者虚构利润的错误反应,行业景气度与同伴公司反应程度存在负向关系,处于成长期的同伴公司更容易受行业领导者虚构利润的影响,表现出更大规模的投资扩张。本文基于行业特征视角研究财务报告舞弊产生的溢出效应,有助于理解“同伴效应”形成的内在机制,也为财务舞弊产生的不良经济后果提供了新的经验证据。

Corporate peer effects mean that corporate policies are influenced by the characteristics and actions of other firms in the reference group. It is generally recognized that managerial peer learning is the main driving factor of corporate peer effects, but it is questionable whether such a behavior of peer learning is rational.   We find that misstated financial statements paint a picture of rosy industry prospects that leads peer firms to make unexpected or distorted decisions. Furthermore, the magnitude of the distortion varies predictably with peer firms’ characteristics. Specifically, first of all, industry competition intensifies peer firms’ wrong response to industry leaders’ fraudulent financial reporting. Second, there exists a negative relationship between the response of peer firms and industry prosperity. The capital expenditure level of peer firms is higher in economic downturn than in economic prosperity. In addition, peer firms in the life cycle of a growing industry are more likely to be affected by the fraudulent financial reporting of industry leaders, exhibiting higher investment expansion. These results show that fraudulent financial reporting not only reduces the investment efficiency of the firm itself, but also leads to irrational investment in the whole industry, and the degree of influence varies with the industry attributes of peer firms.  This paper makes the following contributions to the exiting literature. First, we investigate the spillover effects of fraudulent financial reporting from the perspective of industry characteristics, which helps to understand the internal mechanism of peer effect formation and provides new empirical evidence for the negative economic consequences of financial fraud. Second, we find that fraudulent financial reporting by industry leaders will distort investment decisions of peer firms. It’s important for the company management to pay attention to screening peer financial information to optimize investment decisions. At the same time, exploring the differences of spillover effects in different industries can help regulators to identify which industries are most affected by negative externalities of fraudulent financial reporting.

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