地方政府赶超压力对辖区企业过度投资的影响
The Impact of Catch-up Pressure on Overinvestment by Enterprises in the Jurisdiction of Local Governments
DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2018.10.010
[1]徐光伟,谭瑾,孙铮.地方政府赶超压力对辖区企业过度投资的影响[J/OL].外国经济与管理,2018,40(10):122-138[2026-11-20].https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2018.10.010.
摘要
基于地区之间竞争特殊的经济体制,实证检验了地方政府面临的经济赶超压力对辖区企业过度投资行为的影响,研究发现:(1)地区人均GDP、人均财政收入与辖区企业过度投资程度显著负相关;地区GDP、财政收入排名与辖区企业过度投资程度显著正相关。(2)以土地价格扭曲程度作为中介变量,研究发现经济赶超压力导致土地价格扭曲。在控制土地价格因素后,经济赶超压力对辖区企业过度投资的影响不再显著。土地价格扭曲在经济赶超压力对辖区企业过度投资的影响中起到中介作用。(3)制衡的股权结构、外部市场竞争能够有效制约企业过度投资行为,而具有政治关联的企业过度投资程度更加严重。公司治理、市场竞争、政治关联在经济赶超压力对辖区企业过度投资行为的影响中发挥显著的调节作用。研究为微观企业过度投资的形成以及宏观产能过剩的化解提供了有意义的参考。
During the period of economic transition, there is a phenomenon that China experiences a long period of overcapacity and excessive investment. Sustained overcapacity leads to the unbalanced industrial structure, heavy corporate debt, and low economic efficiency. The essence of excess capacity is the overinvestment behavior of micro enterprises. The existing literature has studied the phenomenon of overcapacity and overinvestment, forming two viewpoints: " market failure” and " government failure”. China has gradually established its own economic system in the period of economic transition. Under the system of fiscal decentralization and political centralization, the contract of China’s economic system is decomposed into local governments through layer upon layer of contracting. For economic and political reasons, competition among regions at the same level leads to the short-term behavior. Local governments have the motivation and ability to use their resources to intervene in corporate investment activities in their jurisdictions. Based on the special economic system of regional competition, this paper uses the data of listed companies to test the influence of the economic catch-up pressure faced by local governments on the overinvestment behavior of enterprises in the region. Firstly, we select China listed companies as samples during 2002-2015 years, and use three methods to measure the degree of overinvestment. Secondly, we take per capita GDP, per capita fiscal revenue as independent variables to test the impact of local economic catch-up pressure on the overinvestment of enterprises in the area. Then we use land price to measure the distorted degree of regional land resource allocation, and use the mediating effect model to examine the mediating role of distortion of factor allocation. Finally, we examine the moderating effect of the ownership structure, market competition and political connection on the impact of economic catch-up pressure on the overinvestment behavior of enterprises in the area. We find that:(1)There is a significant negative correlation between per capita GDP, per capita fiscal revenue and the overinvestment level of enterprises. There is a significant positive correlation between the ranking of GDP, fiscal revenue and the overinvestment level.(2)Economic catch-up pressure causes land price distortion. Land price distortion plays an intermediary role in the influence of economic catch-up pressure on overinvestment.(3)The balance of the ownership structure and external market competition can effectively limit the overinvestment behavior of enterprises, and the overinvestment of enterprises with political connections is even more serious. Based on China’s special economic system, this paper reveals the influence of local governments’ economic catch-up pressure on the investment behavior of enterprises in the region from the perspective of regional competition. This study provides a meaningful reference for the formation mechanism of overinvestment in micro enterprises and the resolution of macro capacity surplus.
关键词: 赶超压力,过度投资,产能过剩,地区竞争