大股东股权制衡的公司治理效应——来自民营上市公司的证据

The Corporate Governance Effect of Large Shareholders’ Equity Balance: Evidence from Private Listed Companies

赵国宇,禹薇

2018 第 40 卷 第 11 期 页码 60-72

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2018.11.005

PDF全文下载 HTML全文

摘要

目前关于股权制衡的研究重点关注股权制衡对公司业绩的影响,而对其作用机制及路径并未引起足够重视,同时也忽视了关系大股东产生的负面影响。利用我国民营上市公司数据,实证分析了股权制衡的治理效应与作用路径,并进一步分析大股东持股水平、大股东关系对股权制衡治理机制的影响。研究结果表明,股权制衡既提高了公司投资效率,也抑制了大股东掏空,因此促进了公司经营业绩。对于大股东控制程度较低的公司,股权制衡削弱了投资无效率与掏空导致的不利影响,但对于大股东控制力较强的公司,股权制衡的治理机制并未显著发挥作用。如果公司存在关系大股东,大股东可能采取一致行动实施掏空行为。关系大股东的存在导致股权制衡也难以发挥投资效率促进和掏空抑制的治理作用。

This paper studies the influence of equity balance on the performance of the company from two aspects of investment efficiency promotion and large shareholders’ hollowing down. On this basis, the paper further studies the impact of the large shareholder holding level and the large shareholder relationship on the effectiveness of equity checks and balance. Using the data of private listed companies in China, this paper constructs an empirical research model based on investment efficiency and tunneling as mediator variables. The results show that equity balance improves corporate investment efficiency and inhibits the tunneling of large shareholders, thereby enhancing the performance of the company. Therefore, from the perspective of the second type of agency cost, the effective balance view of large shareholders has been verified. The controlling rights of several major shareholders play an important role in restricting large shareholders’ looting of the company behavior. Equity balance promotes the efficiency of corporate investment, and other large shareholders can also inhibit the tunneling behavior of large shareholders. However, for large shareholders with strong control, equity balance cannot play a corresponding role in corporate governance. In the plundering of the interests of minority shareholders, large shareholders will not only show equity checks and balance, but also collusion between major shareholders. If there is a large shareholder in the company, the possibility of conspiracy to be emptied by the company is relatively large. When the company has many large shareholders and these large shareholders have a hollowing motive, they may join up to act together to form a conspiracy of large shareholders.   The contributions of this article lie in two aspects. First, the research on equity balance in promoting the efficiency of investment and restraining the corporate governance effect of large stockholders, explores the effect path of equity balance on the performance promotion, and the related research results of expanding and perfecting equity balance. Second, by studying that major shareholders may form a joint conspiracy to invade the company’s interests and analyzing the impact of the shareholder relationship on the effectiveness of equity checks and balance, this paper reveals the relationship between relational shareholders and equity checks and balance, which affects the company’s performance and tunneling. The conclusions provide a theoretical basis and policy recommendations for the improvement of the company ownership structure, the corporate governance mechanism and the investor protection.

参考文献

1 陈德萍, 陈永圣. 股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司绩效关系研究——2007—2009年中小企业板块的实证检验[J]. 会计研究,2011, (1): 38-43 DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2011.01.007
5 刘少波, 马超. 经理人异质性与大股东掏空抑制[J]. 经济研究,2016, (4): 129-145 DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1672-5719.2016.04.110
12 杨文君, 何捷, 陆正飞. 家族企业股权制衡度与企业价值的门槛效应分析[J]. 会计研究,2016, (11): 38-45 DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2016.11.006
14 Bennedsen M, Wolfenzon D. The balance of power in closely held corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000, 58(1-2): 113-139 DOI:10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00068-4
15 Faccio M, Lang L H P. The ultimate ownership of western European corporations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002, 65(3): 365-395 DOI:10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00146-0
16 Gomes J, Livdan D. Optimal diversification: Reconciling theory and evidence[J]. The Journal of Finance,2004, 59(2): 507-535 DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00641.x
17 La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F, Shleifer A, et al. Investor protection and corporate valuation[J]. The Journal of Finance,2002, 57(3): 1147-1170 DOI:10.1111/1540-6261.00457
19 Richardson S. Over-investment of free cash flow[J]. Review of Accounting Studies,2006, 11(2-3): 159-189 DOI:10.1007/s11142-006-9012-1
20 Shleifer A, Vishny R W. A survey of corporate governance[J]. The Journal of Finance,1997, 52(2): 737-783 DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x
21 Wang K, Xiao X. Controlling shareholders' tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2011, 30(1): 89-100 DOI:10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2010.09.014