社会关系网络与风险投资的退出业绩——基于效率与效益视角的双重考察

Social Relationship Network and Withdrawal Performance of Venture Capital: Investigation from Efficiency and Effectiveness Perspectives

孙淑伟,俞春玲

2018 第 40 卷 第 01 期 页码 107-123

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2018.01.008

PDF全文下载 HTML全文

摘要

在风险投资过程中,筹资、投资和退出是风险投资的主要经济活动,其中退出是风险投资中最重要的环节。从社会关系网络的理论出发,已有研究多从退出率的角度衡量风险投资的退出业绩,本文则将退出业绩分拆为效率和效益的双重视角,分析了风险投资通过2000年至2014年间的联合投资事件构建的社会关系网络对其退出业绩的影响。研究发现:风险投资所处的社会关系网络位置能够显著提高退出效率和退出效益。进一步地,本文对风险投资获取较高退出业绩的渠道进行了考察,实证结果表明:风险投资所处的度数中心度等社会关系网络位置越有利,其投资公司的质量就越高,具体表现在IPO前的会计信息质量越高、IPO后的研发产出越多、IPO后的会计业绩表现越优秀。本文的结论对风险投资提高退出业绩具有一定的实践意义。

In the venture capital market, fund raising, investment and withdrawal are all prime economic activities, wherein withdrawal is the most important link in the field of venture capital. Previous studies have probed into the factors which might influence withdrawal performance of venture capital, including economic cycle, venture capital reputation, investment experience and operation scale. From the perspective of social relationship network, this paper divides withdrawal performance into the dual perspectives of efficiency and benefits and illustrates 100 venture capital institutions with maximum investment behaviors between 2001 and 2014 as the research subjects. Based on the joint investment events during the 15 years in the 100 institutions, this paper delineates social relationship network draft among these institutions to obtain degree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality and structural hole degree indicators and starts from the perspectives of efficiency and benefits to examine the influences of social relationship network on withdrawal performance. First of all, this paper takes the overall withdrawal rate of venture capital during sampling period as the measurement indicator to calculate the withdrawal efficiency. As testified by the empirical research results, social relationship network of venture capital has prominent positive influences on the withdrawal efficiency. Secondly, this paper illustrates 506 withdrawal events of the 100 venture capital institutions in the form of IPO through Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2000 to 2014. The empirical research results prove that in case of higher degree centrality of venture capital, if investment companies have shorter history from entrepreneurship to IPO, they would easily withdraw the venture capital at a faster speed. All of such results indicate that venture capital in critical positions of social relationship network has more chances to obtain necessary resources and information, more prominent information advantages and information controlling abilities and faster risk investment withdrawal operations. Subsequently, it observes the significantly positive correlation between venture capital degree centrality indicator and IPO, and between corporate PE and buy-and-hold returns(market returns one year after holding and IPO), which means that venture capital withdrawal has better benefits in critical positions of social network. Finally, this paper explores how venture capital could obtain better performance in advantageous social network positions, concluding that social relationship network of venture capital could improve the quality of invested companies, including higher accounting information quality before IPO, more research and development output after IPO and higher accounting performance after IPO. It has the following contributions. First of all, existing studies mostly measure successful withdrawal(Dang Xinghua et al., 2011), withdrawal rate(Hochberg et al., 2007)and withdrawal performance of venture capital. Little attention has been paid to the studies on the two indicators, namely withdrawal efficiency and withdrawal benefits. This paper starts from the perspectives of efficiency and benefits to examine the influences of social relationship network built by venture capital through joint investment events on withdrawal performance. And it further explores how venture capital could obtain higher withdrawal performance and enrich relevant studies in the field of venture capital. Secondly, this paper is the beneficial expansion of relevant literature documents related to social relationship network in Chinese venture capital market. Existing studies mainly start from the perspective of individual characteristics of venture capital to evaluate the withdrawal performance of venture capital. By placing venture capital companies under the background of social relationship network, this paper refers to sociology research methods to analyze and test the influences of social relationship network on withdrawal performance. It is the beneficial expansion for literature documents in the field of social relationship. Thirdly, risk investment is a high-risk and high-return process. Venture capital always tries to reduce uncertainty and elevate benefits. If venture capital expects to obtain better withdrawal performance, it requires to reduce the uncertainty of benefits and obtain more scarce resources & information. Therefore, venture capital should also consider its position in social network while improving its investment skills or accumulating investment experience. In this sense, this paper has practice meanings for venture capital to elevate withdrawal performance.

参考文献

1 蔡宁, 何星. 社会网络能够促进风险投资的" 增值”作用吗——基于风险投资网络与上市公司投资效率的研究[J]. 金融研究, 2015,(12): 178–193.
2 党兴华, 董建卫, 吴红超. 风险投资的网络位置与成功退出: 来自中国风险投资业的经验证据[J]. 南开管理评论, 2011(2): 82–91.
3 潘红波, 余明桂. 政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J]. 管理世界, 2008(8): 9–21.
4 钱苹, 张帏. 我国创业投资的回报率及其影响因素[J]. 经济研究, 2007(5): 78–90.
5 吴文锋, 吴冲锋, 芮萌. 中国上市公司高管的政府背景与税收优惠[J]. 管理世界, 2009(3): 134–142.
6 杨隽萍, 唐鲁滨, 于晓宇. 创业网络、创业学习与新创企业成长[J]. 管理评论, 2013(11): 24–33.
7 赵静梅, 傅立立, 申宇. 风险投资与企业生产效率: 助力还是阻力[J]. 金融研究, 2015(11): 159–174.
8 张军, 徐小钦. 我国风险投资退出渠道的路径选择研究[J]. 科学经济社会, 2004(3): 52–55.
9 张学勇, 张叶青. 风险投资、创新能力与公司IPO的市场表现[J]. 经济研究, 2016(10): 112–125.
10 Amit R, Bander J, Zott C. Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence[J]. Journal of Business Venturing, 1998, 13(6): 441–466. DOI:10.1016/S0883-9026(97)00061-X
11 Ball R, Robin A, Wu J S. Incentives versus standards: properties of accounting income in four east asian countries[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2003, 36(3): 235–270.
12 Cohen L, Frazzini A, Malloy C. The Small World of Investing: Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2008, 116(5): 951–979. DOI:10.1086/592415
13 Cohen L, Frazzini A, Malloy C. Sell-side school tie[J]. Journal of Finance, 2010, 65(4): 1409–1437. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01574.x
14 Cumming D, Johan S A. Provincial preferences in private equity[J]. Financial Markets Portfolio Management, 2006, 20(4): 369–398.
15 Das S, M Jagannathan, A Sarin. Private equity returns: an empirical examination of the exit of venture-backed companies[J]. Journal of Investment Management, 2002, 1(1): 1–26.
16 Ferrary M, Granovetter M. The role of venture capital firms in silicon valley’s complex innovation network[J]. Economy and Society, 2009, 38(2): 326–359. DOI:10.1080/03085140902786827
17 Gompers P A, Lerner J. Money chasing deals? the impact of fund inflows on private equity valuations[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 55(2): 239–279. DOI:10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00051-3
18 Gompers P A, Kovner A, Lerner J, Scharfstein D. Venture capital investment cycles: the impact of public markets[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, 87(1): 1–23.
19 Guler I, Guillen M F. Home country networks and foreign expansion: evidence from the venture capital industry[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2010, 53(2): 390–410. DOI:10.5465/AMJ.2010.49389027
20 Hochberg Y V, Ljungqvist A, Lu Y. Whom you know matters? venture capital networks and investment performance[J]. Journal of Finance, 2007, 62(1): 251–301. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01207.x
21 Ishii Joy, Y H Xuan. Acquirer target social ties and merger outcomes[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2014, 112(3): 344–363. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.02.007
22 Kaplan S N. Private equity performance: returns, persistence, and capital flows. Journal of Finance[J], 2005, 60(4): 1791–1823. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00780.x
23 Kothari S P, Leone Andrew J, Wasley Charles E. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2005, 39(1): 163–197. DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.11.002
24 Lerner J. The syndication of venture capital investments[J]. Financial Management, 1994, 23(3): 16–27. DOI:10.2307/3665618
25 Liu M, Zhang J A, Hu B. Domestic VCs versus foreign VCs: a close look at the Chinese venture capital industry[J]. International Journal of Technology Management, 2006, 34(1): 161–184.
26 Nahata R. Venture capital reputation and investment performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economic, 2008, 90(2): 127–151. DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.11.008
27 Park S, Luo Y. Guanxi and organizational dynamics: organizational networking in Chinese organizations[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2001, 22(5): 455–477. DOI:10.1002/(ISSN)1097-0266
28 Sapienza H J, Manigart S, Vermeir W. Venture capitalist governance and value-added in four countries[J]. Journal of Business Venturing, 1996, 11(6): 439–469. DOI:10.1016/S0883-9026(96)00052-3
29 Sorenson O, Stuart T. Syndication networks and the spatial distribution of venture capital investments[J]. American Journal of Sociology, 2001, 106(6): 1546–1588. DOI:10.1086/321301
30 Stuart T E, S Yim. Board interlocks and the propensity to be targeted in private equity transactions[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 2001, 97(1): 174–189.
31 Tykvova T. Who chooses whom? syndication, skills and reputation[J]. Review of Financial Economics, 2007, 16(1): 5–28. DOI:10.1016/j.rfe.2005.10.001