治理机制的改善起到了修复作用吗?——基于败德行为与组织经营绩效关系的研究

Does the Improvement of the Governance Mechanism Play a Repairing Role? A Study Based on the Relationship between Immoral Irregularities and Organizational Performance

连燕玲,刘依琳,高皓,罗昆

2019 第 41 卷 第 07 期 页码 72-84

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2019.07.005

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摘要

企业成长中的伦理道德问题一直是实践界和学术界关注的焦点,本文从企业合法性的视角分析了公司违法违规等败德行为对组织经营的影响,重点分析了公司治理机制——监督和惩罚机制的改善,以及修复该种负面效应的作用机制。基于1994—2013年中国上市公司的违法违规数据,得到以下研究结论:第一,企业败德行为被揭露后,对组织后续财务和市场运作绩效均产生巨大负面效应。第二,随着监督机制的增强(董事会独立性和投资机构持股的提升),败德行为对后续绩效的负面影响效应得到弱化。第三,惩罚机制的增强(CEO更换)同样也起到了修复败德行为负面影响效应的作用。第四,机构投资者监督对市场操纵性败德行为所带来的负向作用的弱化和修复作用相对更加稳健;而CEO变更对两种类型的败德行为的修复作用均较为显著。本研究结论充分表明当企业违法违规等败德行为被揭露后,监督和惩罚机制的改善在修复企业合法性和后续运作绩效方面起到显著的作用。

The ethical issues in the growth of enterprises have always been the focus of practice and academia, and the existence of enterprises is closely related to their morality. This paper analyzes the negative effect of immoral irregularities on organizational performance from the perspective of enterprise legitimacy, especially the repairing effect of the governance mechanism(supervision and punishment mechanisms).

Based on the illegal data of Chinese listed companies from 1994 to 2013, this paper gets the following conclusions: First, the revelation of immoral irregularities incurs a great negative effect to the subsequent financial(ROA)and marketing(Tobin’s Q)performance. Second, the enhancement of the supervision mechanism(improvement of board independence and investment institution shareholdings)can repair violation behaviors’ negative effect on the subsequent performance. Third, the improvement of the punishment mechanism(CEO replacement)also plays a repairing role on violation behaviors’ negative outcomes, for the public regard CEO replacement as a representation that the original organization has been changed, which can reduce the negative impact of legitimacy loss on performance. Fourth, institutional investors’ supervision plays a relatively more stable role in weakening and repairing the negative effect of marketing irregularities, while CEO replacement has a more significant repairing effect on both types of irregularities. This study shows when enterprises’ immoral irregularities are announced, the improvement of supervision and punishment mechanisms plays a significant role in repairing enterprises’ legitimacy and the subsequent operating performance.

By introducing the two aspects of the governance mechanism, supervision and punishment into the research framework, this paper examines the role played by the improvement of the two mechanisms in repairing enterprise legitimacy and weakening immoral irregularities, making the following research contributions: On the one hand, it deeply analyzes the effect of immoral irregularity revelation on the subsequent operational performance at the enterprise level, rather than at the stock market level. On the other hand, this paper focuses on whether and how the improvement of supervision and punishment mechanisms restores enterprise legitimacy, and alleviates the negative effect of immoral irregularities, more than only discussing the negative effect and its degree after the immoral irregularities exposed. There are also some shortcomings in the study. While the direct cost faced by enterprises after immoral irregularity revelation cannot be obtained, it is impossible to distinguish and test the differences between direct and indirect effects of the uncovered immoral irregularities, but these are topics that deserve further study.

The managerial implications of this article are listed as follow: First, enterprises must regulate their business activities and avoid immoral irregularities for their long-term survival and development. Second, enterprises can prevent immoral irregularities from happening through strengthening the supervision mechanism such as the improvement of the independence and supervisory initiative of the board of directors. Third, the punishment mechanism should be reinforced when enterprises’ violation behaviors are announced, for this kind of behaviors can help enterprises get out of the scandals as soon as possible.

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