财务问询函能够提高年报可读性吗?——来自董事联结上市公司的经验证据

Can Financial Inquiry Letters Improve the Readability of Annual Reports? Evidence from Listed Companies with Directors’ Ties

翟淑萍,王敏,白梦诗

2020 第 42 卷 第 09 期 页码 136-152

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20200615.201

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摘要

本文从年报可读性视角,探究交易所问询函对董事联结公司年报可读性的治理作用。研究发现,财务报告问询函能够发挥显著的监管效果,不仅提高收函公司(发讯公司)年报可读性,而且促使与收函公司具有董事联结关系的上市公司(受讯公司)改善年报披露行为。尤其是当投资者关注度高、媒体报道多和产品市场竞争激烈的公司被问询时,受讯公司会更大幅度提高年报可读性。作用机理检验证实,财务报告问询函降低收函公司盈余管理、增加违规成本,对收函公司年报可读性产生直接影响;同时,基于联结董事对信息的传递并出于对其声誉的维护,问询函对受讯公司年报可读性产生间接影响。本文将问询函影响的范围从收函公司本身拓展至具有董事联结的公司,探讨交易所问询监管能否发挥间接治理效果,为完善证券市场监管模式、提高市场监管效率提供了新的思路。

From the perspective of the readability of annual reports, this paper explores the governance effect of exchanges’ inquiry letters on the readability of annual reports. It is found that the inquiry letter of financial reports can play a significant regulatory role, not only improving the readability of annual reports of the inquired company(the sending company), but also promoting the listed company(the receiving company)which has the relationship with the inquired company’s directors to improve the annual report disclosure behavior. Especially when the companies with high investor attention, more media reports and fierce product market competition are inquired, the receiving companies will greatly improve the readability of annual reports. The mechanism of action test confirms that the inquiry letter of financial reports reduces the earnings management of the inquired company and increases the cost of violation, which has a direct impact on the readability of the annual report of the inquired company; at the same time, the inquiry letter has an indirect impact on the readability of the annual report of the receiving company based on the connection between the transmission of information by the directors and the maintenance of their reputation.

The possible marginal contributions of this paper are mainly as follows:(1)Existing research on the effect of inquiry letters on accounting information governance mainly focuses on the research on information quantity, earnings management and performance forecast. This paper extends it to the impact on the readability of the annual report of listed companies, enriching the research on the economic consequence of the inquiry letter system.(2)Existing research on the influencing factors of the readability of annual reports mainly focuses on the external environment such as litigation risks, social relations and product market competition, and the internal characteristics of the company. This paper explores the inquiry letter effect on the readability of annual reports from a new perspective of the supervision of the inquiry letter of exchanges’ financial reports, broadening the research on the factors that affect the readability of annual reports.(3)Existing studies on the indirect impact of inquiry letters only focus on the “contagion” of inter industry behaviors. In view of the existence of the social network relationship between enterprises, this paper puts the organizational imitation behavior in directors’ ties into the research scope of the indirect impact of inquiry letters, investigates the impact of the letter receiving behavior of the inquired company on the annual report disclosure decision-making of the directors’ affiliated company, makes up for the lack of the existing research on the indirect impact of inquiry letters, and enriches the research on the economic consequence of directors’ ties.(4)From the perspective of corporate external governance environment, this paper discusses the conditions and basis of the indirect impact of inquiry letters. While deepening the understanding of the relationship between corporate external governance mechanisms, it also provides policy basis for improving the supervision mechanism of inquiry letters and realizing the effective play of the supervision and governance mechanism of inquiry letters.

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