党组织“双向进入、交叉任职”能抑制企业信息披露违规吗?

Can the “Two-way Entry and Cross-serving” of Party Organizations Restrain Corporate Information Disclosure Violations?

王梦凯,刘一霖,李良伟,马德芳

2022 第 44 卷 第 12 期 页码 19-34

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20220905.201

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摘要

本文以2010—2020年我国A股非金融上市公司为研究样本,分别从“双向进入”和“交叉任职”两个维度实证检验党组织参与治理对企业信息披露违规的影响。研究发现:(1)党组织参与治理能够抑制企业信息披露违规,具体表现为党组织“双向进入、交叉任职”能够抑制企业信息披露的违规倾向、违规次数,在考虑遗漏变量偏差、自选择问题、互为因果等内生性问题后,实证结果依然稳健。(2)渠道检验发现,党组织参与治理能够通过提高企业内部控制质量、降低经营风险发挥积极的治理作用,进而抑制企业信息披露违规。(3)进一步研究发现,在国有企业中,党组织参与治理对信息披露违规的抑制作用更为显著,但是在不同政府行业管制的情境下,党组织参与治理对企业信息披露违规的抑制作用不存在显著差异。本文不仅补充了党组织治理和企业信息披露的相关文献,还为加强党组织建设、净化市场生态、维护资本市场经济秩序提供了一定的经验参考。

The participation of Party organizations in governance through “two-way entry and cross-serving” is a special institutional arrangement of Chinese corporate governance. As the concentrated expression of the Party’s proposition in micro-enterprises, the participation of Party organizations will have a significant impact on the business decision-making of enterprises. With the deepening of registration system reform, sufficient and authentic information disclosure of listed companies has become the core point of capital market reform, but few studies have included information disclosure violations into the research framework of Party organization participation in governance. Then, if Party organizations adopt “two-way entry and cross-serving” to participate in corporate governance, can it restrain corporate information disclosure violations?

This paper takes China’s A-share non-financial listed companies from 2010 to 2020 as the research sample, empirically tests the impact of Party organization participation in governance on corporate information disclosure violations from the two dimensions of “two-way entry and cross-serving”. The results show that: (1) The participation of Party organizations in governance can inhibit information disclosure violations. Specifically, “two-way entry and cross-serving” can inhibit the violation tendency and number of information disclosure. After considering omitted variable bias, self-selection problems, and mutual causality, the empirical results are still robust. (2) The participation of Party organizations in governance can play a positive governance role by improving the quality of internal control and reducing operational risks, thereby inhibiting information disclosure violations. (3) The participation of Party organizations in governance has a more significant inhibitory effect on information disclosure violations. However, in the context of different government industry regulations, there is no significant difference.

The contributions are as follows: (1) This paper expands the research scope of Party organization participation in governance from the perspective of corporate information disclosure. The quality of information disclosure is the core element of the deepening reform of the capital market, which is directly related to fairness, pricing efficiency and resource allocation capabilities. It verifies the information disclosure governance effect of Party organization participation in governance at the capital market level, and also provides supplementary evidence for socialist corporate governance with Chinese characteristics. (2) This paper enriches the relevant research on the influencing factors of information disclosure violations from the perspective of Party politics. It studies the mechanism of internal control quality and operational risks in the impact of Party organization participation in governance on information disclosure violations, enriching the relevant literature in the fields of corporate governance, personal characteristics and information disclosure violations. (3) This paper reveals the nature of property rights and the heterogeneity of government industry regulation from the dimension of the relationship between the government and enterprises, and more comprehensively answers the impact of Party organization participation in governance on information disclosure violations. It provides a certain experience reference for strengthening the construction of Party organizations, purifying the market ecology, and maintaining the economic order of the capital market.

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