金融中介功能的经济分析与应对金融危机的经验教训——2022年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主主要经济理论贡献述评

Economic Analysis of Financial Intermediaries and Lessons from Financial Crisis Response: A Review of Main Contributions by 2022 Nobel Economics Laureates

李宝良,郭其友,郑文智

2022 第 44 卷 第 11 期 页码 138-152

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20221031.101

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摘要

伯南克(Ben S. Bernanke)、戴蒙德(Douglas W. Diamond)和迪布维格(Philip H. Dybvig)三位美国经济学家因对银行和金融危机研究的贡献,荣膺2022年度诺贝尔经济学奖。本文从三个方面重点评述他们对银行及一般金融中介在经济中(特别是金融危机期间)的作用的奠定性研究贡献。首先,戴蒙德和迪布维格对银行期限转换的研究以及戴蒙德对代理监督的研究,共同夯实了金融中介功能、运作及其内在脆弱性的微观基础,也提供了把握金融体系演变规律和最优监管政策设计的分析框架;其次,伯南克对大萧条期间银行倒闭影响和金融加速器理论的研究,构筑了探索金融摩擦对经济影响的宏观基础,也提供了理解信贷传导渠道与金融传播机制的框架;最后,借助他们对金融中介功能的微观和宏观分析,重新透视2007—2009年全球金融危机,可以帮助我们更好地理解金融危机演变以及相关政策背后的经济学逻辑和经验教训。当今世界金融创新日新月异,金融危机频繁发生,三位获奖者的研究对如何构建一个高效运行的金融体系给出了一般性的思考,对进一步健全货币政策和宏观审慎政策“双支柱”调控框架具有参考价值。

Ben S. Bernanke, Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2022 for their research on banks and financial crises. This paper focuses on three aspects of their contributions. First of all, Diamond and Dybvig’s research on maturity transformation and Diamond’s research on delegating monitoring have jointly consolidated the micro-foundation of the function of financial intermediation and its inherent vulnerability, and also provided an analytical framework to grasp the evolution law of the financial system and the optimal regulatory policy design. According to Diamond and Dybvig model, as long as maturity transformation is involved, financial intermediaries and financial innovation inevitably have inherent fragility, so they should be included in the scope of financial supervision. The design of regulatory policy should focus on the function of financial intermediary and financial innovation. The financial function provides criteria for judging which financial intermediary and financial innovation should be included in financial regulation.

Secondly, Bernanke’s research on the impact of bank failures during the Great Depression and the theory of financial accelerator has built a macro basis for exploring the impact of financial frictions on the economy, and also provided a framework for understanding credit transmission channels and monetary transmission mechanisms. The financial accelerator theory provided more credit transmission channels such as balance sheet channels other than bank credit transmission channels, which enabled us to have a more comprehensive understanding of credit transmission channels and the dynamic transmission process of financial crisis. The dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework used by Bernanke to analyze financial accelerators has incorporated financial frictions, providing an important tool for evaluating and predicting the effects of various financial policies.

Finally, we can re-examine the global financial crisis in 2007-2009 to help us better understand the evolution of the financial crisis, as well as the economic logic and lessons learned behind relevant policies. The run and spread of shadow banks have evolved into a financial panic, which is expected by Diamond and Dybvig model. The spread of financial panic through bank credit transmission channels and balance sheet channels has a serious negative impact on the economy, which is expected by Bernanke’s financial accelerator theory. The most important lesson is that micro-prudential supervision is not enough to prevent financial crisis. Financial supervision should also consider the safety and robustness of the overall financial system, which is also the origin of macro-prudential supervision policies.

In today’s world, where financial innovation is changing rapidly, their contributions have given a general consideration on how to build a highly efficient, safe and robust financial system, and have reference value for further improving the dual pillar regulatory framework of monetary policy and macro-prudential policy.

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