党组织嵌入对企业行为自律的影响——基于企业风险的视角

The Impact of Party Organization Embeddedness on Enterprise Behavior Self-discipline: Based on the Perspective of Enterprise Risk

王元芳,马连福

2021 第 43 卷 第 12 期 页码 19-34

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20211115.201

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摘要

党组织内嵌到公司治理结构之中,发挥领导核心作用已成为国企公司治理的最大特征。以2013—2018年国有上市公司样本为研究对象,本文实证分析了国有企业中党组织嵌入公司治理是否会使企业行为更加自律。以党委成员与董事会、监事会和管理层成员职位重合程度作为党组织嵌入的代理变量,实证结果表明,党组织嵌入公司治理可以促进企业行为自律,表现为公司违规、卷入司法诉讼的可能性相对更低,而这种作用主要是通过降低公司风险实现的。进一步研究发现,党组织促使企业行为自律不仅表现在合法合规等强制性行为上,也表现在主动减少盈余管理、提供更高的会计信息质量等自愿性行为自律上。制度环境和行业管制影响这一效果,所在地区政府干预程度越弱、企业处于非管制行业时,党组织促进企业行为自律的作用越大。研究结论为党组织嵌入公司治理的积极作用提供了直接证据,拓展和丰富了中国特色的公司治理理论的相关研究。

The Party organization embedded in the corporate governance structure and playing the leading core role has become the biggest feature of corporate governance of state-owned enterprises. The research on Party organizations and corporate governance has also become the focus of academic attention, and there have been a series of related research, but the existing research only involves the level of enterprise Party organizations, and the heterogeneity of individual Party members has not been further explored. This paper holds that Party members have very distinct individual characteristics. Party members who have been screened and assessed for a long time have high personal ability and quality, as well as high values and moral standards shaped by long-term Party member self-discipline norms and discipline regulations, which will have a sustained and far-reaching impact on their management style, decision-making standards and behavior choices. Taking the sample of state-owned listed companies from 2013 to 2018 as the research object, this paper analyzes the governance effect of enterprise Party organizations from the perspective of enterprise behavior self-discipline, draws lessons from the perspective of individual self-discipline in psychology, takes enterprise violations and involvement in judicial proceedings as the “reverse” proxy variable of enterprise behavior self-discipline, and empirically analyzes the impact of Party organizations embedded in corporate governance on enterprise behavior self-discipline. The results show that the embedding of Party organizations into corporate governance can promote enterprise behavior to be more self-discipline, which is reflected in the relatively lower possibility of enterprise violations and involvement in judicial proceedings, and this effect is mainly realized by reducing the risk of the enterprise. Further research finds that Party organizations promote enterprise behavior self-discipline not only in mandatory behaviors such as legal compliance (explicit self-discipline), but also in voluntary behaviors such as actively reducing earnings management and providing higher quality accounting information (implicit self-discipline). Institutional environment and industry regulation affect this effect. That is, the weaker the local government intervention and when the enterprise is in non-regulated industries, the greater the role of Party organizations in promoting enterprise behavior self-discipline. Compared with the existing literature, this paper may make two contributions: (1) It provides a new research perspective for the related research of enterprise behavior from the perspective of enterprise self-discipline. The existing research lacks direct discussion on enterprise behavior self-discipline. From the perspective of Party organizations embedded in corporate governance, this paper integrates and runs through the impact of three factors on enterprise behavior self-discipline: external institutional environment, corporate governance at the enterprise level and individual executives, and expands the perspective of enterprise behavior research. (2) It expands and enriches the research on corporate governance with Chinese characteristics represented by Party organizations embedded in corporate governance. This paper confirms that the values and beliefs of enterprise Party organizations and Party members will modify and optimize the behavior of senior executives with the identity of Party committee, show a higher moral standard, and then optimize enterprise behavior. The conclusion of this paper provides direct and internal evidence for the role of Party organizations in embedding corporate governance, and confirms the important value of enterprise Party organizations in improving the corporate governance of China’s state-owned enterprises.

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