共同股东的治理效应:文献述评与研究展望

The Governance Effect of Common Ownership: A Literature Review and Prospects

向元高,罗进辉

2023 第 45 卷 第 04 期 页码 38-53

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20220905.202

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摘要

共同股东指同时拥有多家公司股权并对公司治理决策具有重要影响的股东。随着专业投资机构的发展和分散化投资策略的盛行,共同股东已成为世界范围内的普遍现象。本文系统梳理了共同股东治理效应相关研究的发展脉络与最新进展。首先,本文从理论上溯源了共同股东参与治理的内在动机,剖析了其参与治理的具体机制。在此基础上,本文从公司治理的不同维度梳理了共同股东产生的具体治理效果。进一步结合中国资本市场的制度特征,本文探究了共同股东的结构差异以及其面临的治理问题差异,并分析这些差异如何影响共同股东的治理效应。最后,本文从共同股东的成因、具体治理行为、潜在趋同效应、外部制度因素等诸多视角提出未来可以拓展的研究方向。本文通过构建“治理动机→治理机制→治理效果←制度因素”的整合性分析框架,提炼了共同股东发挥治理效应的一般规律,并揭示了其在不同制度背景下的普适性与异质性,为后续相关研究提供参考。

Under the traditional research framework of corporate governance, most studies explicitly or implicitly assume that shareholders only hold shares in one company and shareholder behavior and corporate governance decisions of different companies are independent. However, as common ownership around the world becomes increasingly prevalent, the above assumptions deviate from reality, which has attracted widespread attention from researchers and practitioners. Related studies are on the ascendant in recent years, but the views and findings on the governance effect of common shareholders are increasingly scattered, and there is a lack of systematic analyses, comparisons, and integration.

This paper reviews the latest research progress under an integrative framework, which consists of “governance motivation → governance mechanism → governance effect ← institutional factors”. As to the governance motivation, the difference between common shareholders and ordinary shareholders lies in their co-governance motivation and cost compensation motivation. The governance mechanism of common shareholders can be divided into direct and indirect governance mechanisms. Direct governance mechanism includes voice, compensation contract, voting, and appointment of directors, while indirect governance mechanism includes exit threats and “non-intervention”. Although some of the governance mechanism is also used by non-common shareholders, common shareholders have significantly different effects while implementing the governance mechanism. In terms of the governance effect, in general scenarios, common shareholders have positive governance effects on management supervision, information disclosure, investment and financing, innovation, risk-taking, dividend policy, cash holdings, etc. In the M&A scenario, common shareholders improve M&A decision-making, increase M&A efficiency, enhance M&A outcomes, etc. Overall, this paper indicates that common shareholders play a positive role in corporate governance. However, it should be noted that, due to the investor structure, ownership structure, market institutions, etc., common shareholders under the Chinese institutional background are structurally different and faced with distinct corporate governance issues. As a result, the governance effect of common shareholders in China exhibits more heterogeneity.

This paper makes the following contributions: First, it compares and analyzes the consistency and differences between theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, and summarizes the general rules and conditions for common shareholders to play a positive role in corporate governance. Thus, this paper lays a solid theoretical foundation for future research. Second, it pays a great deal of attention to the Chinese institutional background and identifies several key institutional characteristics, and specifically analyzes how these institutional characteristics affect the nature and structure of common shareholders and what kind of new corporate governance issues they bring. Thus, this paper has a general knowledge of the universality and heterogeneity of common shareholders’ governance effect under the Chinese institutional background, providing a theoretical basis for future research. Third, it comprehensively discusses the limitations of existing research and identifies several research themes for future research, including the formation of common ownership, the specific governance behavior of common shareholders, the inter-firm convergence effect caused by common ownership, and institutional factors that may affect common shareholders, etc. These research themes are of great significance to deepen the understanding of common shareholders’ governance effect.

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