小股东能否发挥大作用?——基于投服中心持股行权与企业违规的研究

Can Minority Shareholders Play a Big Role? A Research Based on ISC Shareholdings and Corporate Violations

周卉,谭跃

2024 第 46 卷 第 02 期 页码 19-34

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20230226.201

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摘要

本文基于上市公司数据,采取双重差分方法,探讨投服中心持股行权对企业违规的影响。研究发现,投服中心持股行权对企业违规产生抑制作用。相比非试点区域上市公司,投服中心行权试点区域的上市公司在试点之后的违规可能性及频次显著降低。中介效应模型的结果表明,投服中心是通过约束大股东的机会主义行为以及激励中小股东参加公司治理这两个作用渠道来抑制企业违规的。媒体关注与投服中心持股行权之间存在协同关系,形成互补,加强其对公司违规的抑制作用。进一步研究发现,投服中心持股行权对于信息披露违规和非信息披露违规均有一定抑制作用;相比一般违规,投服中心持股行权对严重违规的抑制作用更为显著;当投服中心行权范围扩大到全国之后,处理组(原试点区域上市公司)和控制组的违规行为不再具有显著差异;投服中心持股行权对于企业违规的抑制作用随时间推移有所减弱。研究结果为投服中心的投资者保护效果提供理论及现实依据,同时是对近年来兴起的“中小股东积极主义”研究的有益补充,对于希望提升投资者保护水平的新兴经济体具有一定参考意义。

Using the data of listed companies and adopting the DID approach, this paper finds that the shareholding pilot program of China Securities Investor Services Center (ISC) helps to curb corporate violations. Compared with the listed companies in non-pilot areas, the probability and frequency of violations of the listed companies in pilot areas have been significantly reduced. The mediating effect analysis shows that, ISC curbs corporate violations by restraining the opportunistic behavior of major shareholders and encouraging minority shareholders to participate in corporate governance. Media coverage and ISC shareholdings will complement each other in curbing corporate violations. Further research finds that, ISC shareholdings have an inhibitory effect on corporate violations relating to both information disclosure and non-information disclosure. Compared with common violations, the inhibitory effect is more pronounced on serious violations. When the scope is expanded to the whole country, there is no significant difference between the violations of the treatment group and the control group. The inhibitory effect of ISC shareholdings on corporate violations diminishes over time.

This paper may have the following contributions: (1) It contributes to the literature on the protection of minority shareholders and provides references for emerging economies wishing to improve investor protection. (2) It supplements the research on minority shareholder activism emerging in recent years. (3) It provides theoretical support and empirical evidence for the effectiveness of investor protection by ISC, extending the literature on the consequence of ISC shareholdings. (4) It enriches the research on the factors influencing corporate violations from the perspective of ISC, which is a new type of external governance mechanism.

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