大股东股权质押加剧了公司信息披露违规吗?

Does Share Pledging by Controlling Shareholders Aggravate Illegal Actions of Information Disclosure?

张晨宇,武剑锋

2020 第 42 卷 第 05 期 页码 29-41

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20190926.003

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摘要

本文考察了大股东股权质押对公司信息披露违规行为的影响。研究发现,相对于非股权质押公司,股权质押公司更可能发生信息披露违规行为。这说明,大股东在股权质押期间存在着规避控制权转移风险的机会主义动机,导致公司信息披露违规概率增加。但有效的外部治理机制能够发挥监督治理作用,约束大股东的机会主义行为,随着放松卖空限制和机构投资者持股比例增加,股权质押公司的信息披露违规概率显著降低。而且,大股东股权质押对公司信息披露违规行为的影响在低投资者保护地区、非国有企业以及无政治关联企业中更为显著,且这一关系主要存在于隐藏坏消息的公司中。同时,这种影响随着大股东股权质押比例和质押期限的增加而增强,但公司经营违规概率在大股东股权质押期间并未显著增加。本文研究表明,大股东股权质押期间具有规避控制权转移的市值管理动机,迫于大股东的市值管理需求,上市公司存在信息披露违规行为。本文研究结论丰富了股权质押的经济后果研究,对于监管层具有重要的政策启示意义。

This paper investigates the effect of major shareholders’ share pledging on the illegal actions of information disclosure. We find that illegal actions of information disclosure are more likely to occur during the period of major shareholders’ share pledging. Compared with non-share pledging companies, the probability of illegal actions of information disclosure of share pledging companies increases by 15.4%.This finding shows that major shareholders have the incentive to increase the tendency of corporate information disclosure violations and reduce information transparency to avoid the threat of losing control right. However, the external supervision and governance mechanism can constrain the opportunistic behavior of major shareholders during the period of share pledging. Short-selling pressure and institutional investor share-holding can significantly reduce the probability of illegal actions of information disclosure among the share pledging companies. Further research shows that, the effect of share pledging to illegal actions on information disclosure is more evident in the sample of companies hiding bad news, which means it is possible for major shareholders to hide the bad news in opportunistic behaviors so as to diminish the stock price crash’s threat to the control right, leading to a higher rate of illegal actions of information disclosure.

This paper shows that major shareholders have the motivation to use disclosure methods to meet the demand of market value management. And the probability of illegal actions of information disclosure listed firms is increased under this pressure. This paper enriches the research on the economic consequences of the period of major shareholders’ share pledging, and the conclusions have important policy implications for regulators and investors.

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