社会组织党建是否推动了慈善事业的发展?——基于上市公司公益基金会的实证研究

Does Party Organization Construction of Social Organizations Promote the Development of Philanthropy? Based on the Empirical Research of the Listed Company Charitable Foundation

周婷婷,常馨丹

2021 第 43 卷 第 12 期 页码 35-50

DOI: 10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20211111.202

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摘要

立足于上市公司公益基金会运作质量和运作效率双重维度,从基金会党组织建立、党组织类型、党组织书记、党组织规模、党员大会、党的群团工作以及党组织活动经费视角,实证探讨基金会党组织建设对基金会慈善事业的影响效应及其情境依赖性。研究发现,基层党组织建设能够改善基金会的运作质量,促使基金会获得社会组织登记管理机关的更高评级,还能推动基金会的运作效率,让更多善款用于公益慈善事业。共产党员担任基金会监事的比重越大,基金会党组织建设对基金会运作质量的改善效果越明显。基金会委托代理问题越严重,基金会党组织越能够迎难而上,推动基金会的运作效率。进一步研究发现,基金会党建通过约束基金会治理,对基金会运作质量和运作效率产生积极影响。当出资上市公司党组织是基金会的上级党组织时,并未因上市公司对经济利益的看重而损害社会公益,对下级基金会党组织发挥了良好的指导作用,使得基金会党组织建设对基金会运作质量与运作效率的提升效应更加明显。本文从党组织多维特征、党组织活动视角,分析了基金会党建在公益慈善领域的差异性影响,对基金会党建的社会功能实践具有参考价值。基金会党建工作须与基金会内部治理有机结合,保证基层党组织活动经费与行政经费相互独立,并充分考虑基金会权责配置背后的潜在利益冲突,更好地发挥基金会党建对社会治理的积极引导功能。

Under the background that almost all the social organizations have established primary-level Party organizations which have played important roles, whether the Party organization construction of social organizations can promote social governance is a theoretical and practical problem worthy of in-depth study. The listed company charitable foundation is the most flexible and standardized organization type in social organizations. It has strict management regulations in financial audit, information disclosure, supervision and inspection, and discloses the construction information of primary-level Party organizations in detail, providing opportunities for the research on the social function of the Party organization construction of social organizations.

Based on operational quality and operational efficiency, this paper chooses the listed company charitable foundation as the research object and empirically discusses the impact of the Party organization construction of the foundation on philanthropy and its situational dependence. The results show that, the construction of primary-level Party organizations can not only improve operational quality, promoting the foundation to obtain a higher rating from the registration and management authority of social organizations; but also enhance operational efficiency, allowing more donations to be used for public welfare and philanthropy. The greater the proportion of Party members as foundation supervisors, the more obvious the improvement effect of Party organization construction on operational quality. Further research finds that, the Party construction of the foundation has a positive impact on operational quality and operational efficiency by restricting the governance of the foundation. When the Party organization of the founder listed company is the superior Party organization of the foundation, the positive impact of the construction of primary-level Party organizations on operational quality and operational efficiency become more stronger, which demonstrates that the superior Party organization does not damage the social public welfare due to the importance of economic interests in the listed company, and plays an excellent guiding role for the Party organization of the foundation.

Based on the unique data of the Party organization construction of the foundation, this paper deeply analyzes the differences of the specific characteristics of the Party organization construction of social organizations in the exertion of social functions, which extends the theoretical interpretation level to the large sample empirical research level. Moreover, based on the comprehensive quality (operational quality) and core business ability (operational efficiency) of the foundation’s public welfare and charity activities, this paper not only tests the leading function of the construction of primary-level Party organizations in grasping the overall situation, but also depicts the control ability in key dimensions. It also provides empirical evidence for the research on the social function of the Party organization construction of social organizations.

From the perspective of the multi-dimensional characteristics and activities of Party organizations, this paper comprehensively analyzes the differential impact of the Party organization construction of the foundation in the field of charity, which has reference value for the social function practice of the Party organization construction of the foundation. The Party organization construction of the foundation must be organically combined with the internal governance, ensure the independence of activity funds and administrative funds, and fully consider the potential conflict of interests behind the allocation of rights and responsibilities in the foundation. Only in this way, can the positive guiding goals of the Party organization construction of the foundation on social governance be realized.

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